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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC VALUATION OF WATER RESOURCES 
by 
Christina Estela Brown 
Florida International University, 2019 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mahadev Bhat, Major Professor 
Increased potential of flooding caused by heavy precipitation events and sea level rise, as 
well as growing risk of drought that are likely changes in the frequency and spatial 
distribution of climatic conditions, pose particular challenges to water management in 
coastal areas. Extreme events are expected to increase the complexity of managing scarce 
water resources for competing water users. South Florida, which is characterized by a 
mosaic of urban settlements, agricultural areas and natural areas, is served by a highly 
human-engineered water management system grappling to meet multiple objectives, 
including urban and agricultural water supply, flood control, and environmental 
restoration. Climate-induced water shortage or excess often tests the limits of the water 
management engineering system. While the Everglades suffers a lack of freshwater 
inflows, heavy precipitation and flooding events in the U.S. and worldwide in recent 
years have greatly damaged crop production. If model projections of increased weather 
extremes are realized, the cost of crop losses could increase drastically. These costs may 
be borne directly by the farmers impacted or transferred to private insurers or 
governmental disaster relief programs. The present research quantifies monetary values 
of lost recreational fishery ecosystem services due to reduced freshwater flow in the 
vii 
 
Everglades using a survey-based discrete choice methodology, estimated at over $25 
million annually. Examining survey respondents’ willingness to pay for ecosystem 
services in light of their perceptions and preferences regarding the risks posed by climate 
change and sea level rise, when willingness to pay values were adjusted for risk 
perception the annual overall ecosystem service valuation (benefit) of users was 40.03% 
higher than the annual benefits estimated using non-adjusted willingness to pay. The 
economic value of crop flooding indemnity claims is also be estimated at a county level 
using a Stackelberg game-theoretic model, finding that in many years total indemnity far 
exceeds premiums, which are set at levels below farmers’ maximum willingness to pay. 
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1. Introduction 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report outlines changes in the 
frequency, spatial distribution, and magnitude of several climatic conditions and extreme 
events that are likely to occur in the not too distant future that could pose significant risks 
to human well-being (IPCC, 2014). Among such changes are an increased potential of 
flooding caused by increased heavy precipitation events and sea level rise, as well as 
increased risk of drought, and pose particular concern to coastal communities and 
agricultural production. South Florida is among the areas of the U.S. most vulnerable to 
inundation (Dolan & Walker, 2006; Erwin, 2009; Gornall et al., 2010; Scavia et al., 
2002). In addition to inundation, rising sea level can cause shoreline erosion and inland 
migration, and increase salinity of freshwater ecosystems and aquifers (Scavia et al., 
2002). These extreme events are in turn expected to further increase the complexity of 
managing scarce water resources for competing water users. Specifically South Florida, 
which is characterized by a mosaic of urban settlements, agricultural areas and natural 
areas, is served by a highly human-engineered water management system (Harwell et al., 
1996). Management agencies grapple with managing water to meet multiple objectives, 
including urban and agricultural water supply, flood control, and environmental 
restoration. Climate-induced (flood, drought, sea level rise) water shortage or excess 
often tests the limits of this engineering system. 
The Everglades National Park, including Whitewater Bay, Tarpon Bay, and Florida Bay, 
is renowned for its world-class recreational fisheries, generating more than $1.2 billion in 
annual economic activity (Fedler, 2009). The timing, quantity, and quality of freshwater 
inflows can greatly affect salinity and water quality regimes in south Florida coastal bays. 
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Freshwater flows are a key determinant of habitat and fisheries resource productivity 
(Rudnick, Ortner, Browder, & Davis, 2005; Stabenau, Engel, Sadle, & Pearlstine, 2011; 
Walters, Gunderson, & Holling, 1992), making the recreational fishing industry in the 
area a direct beneficiary of improved and sustained fishery habitat. 
Historically, water flowed south from Lake Okeechobee into a broad, slow moving 
shallow river of water. At present, these flows are constrained by a dike and levy system 
and occupy less than half of their original areal extent, relegating the Everglades to part 
of a complex watershed management system regulated primarily for agriculture, flood 
control, and consumptive uses (Ogden, Davis, Jacobs, Barnes, & Fling, 2005; F. H. Sklar, 
Fitz, Wu, Van Zee, & McVoy, 2001; Sklar et al., 2005). As a result, the flow of 
freshwater through the Everglades has been reduced, channelized, and otherwise 
modified such that salinity regimes, biota, and a variety of ecosystem services in the 
coastal Everglades have dramatically changed (Perry, 2008; Rand & Bachman, 2008).  
While the Everglades suffers a lack of freshwater inflows, heavy precipitation and 
flooding events in the United States and worldwide in recent years have greatly damaged 
crop production. If model projections of increased weather extremes are realized (IPCC, 
2014; National Park Service, 2009), the cost of crop losses could increase drastically. 
Recent studies have attempted to simulate the effect of plant damage from excess soil 
moisture in order to estimate crop production loss, finding that losses under current 
climatic conditions may double in the next thirty years to an estimated $3 billion annually 
(Rosenzweig, Tubiello, Goldberg, Mills, & Bloomfield, 2002). These costs may be borne 
directly by the farmers impacted or transferred to private insurers or governmental 
disaster relief programs. 
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The following research will quantify monetary values of lost recreational fishery 
ecosystem services caused by reduced freshwater flow in the Everglades, as well as the 
economic value of crop flooding indemnity claims at a regional or county level.  With the 
risk of future losses increasing because of the uncertainty of extreme events and the 
effects of climate change and sea level rise, quantifying these values is essential to 
evaluating potential policy or management responses.  Ultimately, my research will use 
these estimated economic values within a penalty function framework to simulate 
potential climate or policy scenarios.   
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2. Ecological-Economic Assessment of the Effects of Freshwater Flow in the Florida 
Everglades on Recreational Fisheries 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Everglades National Park (ENP), at the southern end of the Florida peninsula at 
1.5 million acres, comprises the largest subtropical upland to marine ecosystem in North 
America. Everglades National Park contains a range of freshwater sloughs, seasonally 
flooded marl prairies, tropical hardwood hammocks, pine rocklands, and mangrove and 
seagrass-dominated estuarine habitats (Gunderson, 1994; Richardson, 2010; Saha et al., 
2012). The Everglades, as an important migratory corridor, provides breeding and 
foraging habitats for over 400 species of birds, but also water storage and recharge for the 
Biscayne aquifer, the principal source of freshwater for regional human consumption 
(Lorenz, 2014; Saha et al., 2012).  
South Florida’s regional ecosystem is characterized by two distinct seasons, a wet 
season (generally from May-October) and a dry season (generally from November-April) 
(Saha et al., 2012; Brandt et al., 2012). While the average annual rainfall exceeds 60 
inches, variation in tropical weather systems may result in wide seasonal variation and 
large year-to-year fluctuations (1901-2000 standard deviation of 11 inches in the Miami-
Dade area) (Abetew and Huebner, 2001; National Park Service, 2009). Brandt et al. 
(2012) report that approximately 77% of the total annual rainfall occurs during the wet 
season, and remaining 23% during the dry season. 
Prior to the development of the large freshwater drainage system in South Florida 
in the early and mid-20th century, water flowed south from Lake Okeechobee into a 
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broad, slow-moving, shallow river of water. In the post-development period, these flows 
are constrained by a dike and levy system and occupy less than half of their original areal 
extent, relegating the Everglades to part of a complex watershed management system 
regulated primarily for agriculture, flood control, and consumptive uses (Ogden et al., 
2005; Sklar et al., 2001, 2005). As a result, the flow of freshwater through ENP has been 
reduced, diverted, channelized and otherwise modified such that salinity regimes, biota, 
and a variety of ecosystem services in the coastal Everglades have dramatically changed 
(Perry, 2008; Rand & Bachman, 2008).  
As a large, subtropical estuary averaging in depth from 6 to 9 feet, Florida Bay 
provides critical habitat for a variety of species, including seagrasses and coastal 
mangrove communities (Bachman & Rand, 2008). It serves as a nursery for larvae and 
juveniles of many critical species, including fish and wading birds (Lorenz, 2014).  
The ENP, encompassing Whitewater Bay, Tarpon Bay, and Florida Bay, is 
renowned for its world-class recreational fisheries. Commercial fishing has been banned 
in Park waters since the 1980s. Recreational fishing in the greater Everglades area 
generates more than $1.2 billion in annual economic activity, with largemouth bass, red 
drum, snook, Atlantic tarpon, gray snapper and bonefish providing the largest economic 
impact (Fedler, 2009). Timing, quantity, and quality of freshwater inflows can greatly 
affect salinity and water quality regimes in south Florida coastal bays (Wang et al. 2003). 
Freshwater flows are a key determinant of habitat and fisheries resource productivity 
(Rudnick et al., 2005; Stabenau et al., 2011; Walters et al., 1992), making the recreational 
fishing industry in the area a direct beneficiary of improved and sustained fishery habitat.  
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Surface water stage (water depth relative to a given datum) and salinity gradients 
are strongly influenced by the amount of freshwater released through water management 
structures along the northern boundary of ENP (Stabenau et al., 2011; Childers and 
Leonard, 2005). These flows are regulated by the South Florida Water Management 
District (SFWMD) through massive canals and water-control structures. The SFWMD 
determines monthly water delivery targets for the Everglades wetlands on the basis of the 
historical water flow levels (South Florida Water Management District, 2014). However, 
in the recent years, average monthly deliveries have fallen short of these regulatory flow 
targets by more than 80% in some months. Managers are interested in understanding the 
potential ecological and economic impacts associated with water deliveries relative to the 
pressing demands of non-environmental sectors (e.g., agriculture, urban needs, etc.).  
The goal of our paper was to develop a systems approach to systematically 
measure the economic impacts to changes in Everglades recreational ecosystem services 
relative to changes in freshwater management. We developed an integrated ecological-
economic methodology by linking the Everglades hydrology to fisheries production and 
then modeled the effects of freshwater flows on several robust biological indicators. We 
quantified various attributes of the recreational fishing experience, and, finally, link the 
hydrology-influenced anglers’ fishing experience to economic values.  
 Following Johnston et al. (2011; 2012), economic values are developed using a 
stated preference discrete choice experiment, taking care to provide respondents with the 
relevant ecological and hydrological knowledge essential for making informed choices to 
ensure valid willingness to pay estimates. At the end, this integrated methodology allows 
us to estimate losses in economic welfare caused by missing monthly freshwater delivery 
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targets in the Everglades. These welfare losses are simply the foregone benefit or penalty 
of failing to meet exogenously determined freshwater flow targets. These penalty 
estimates serve as useful decision-support metrics for water resource managers making 
regional water resource allocations. While the conceptual model of the penalty function 
has been used in hydro-economic optimization (Harou et al., 2009; Jenkins et al., 2004; 
Newlin et al., 2002), its application to ecosystem services in terms of recreational 
fisheries is novel. In particular, the flexibility of the penalty function approach lends itself 
to applications to management scenario analysis and evaluation of potential restoration 
projects. This study advances ecosystem services valuation methods through its 
integrated hydrological-ecological-economic model. 
 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Delineation of the Study Area 
The geographic focus of the study is the ENP watershed, in particular the Shark 
River Slough (SRS) (Figure 1). Our goal is to assess the economic value of managing 
water through the Northern boundary of ENP. The relevant water structures involved in 
these flows are S12A-D, S333, and S334, located along Tamiami Trail (U.S. 41) at the 
northern boundary of ENP. The SRS region is bounded by state road U.S. 41 to the north, 
Gulf of Mexico to the southwest, Miami Rock Ridge to the east, and marl prairies to the 
west. The areal extent of the slough considered in this study is approximately 1700 km2 
(Saha et. al., 2012). At the western end of the slough is an estuarine zone including 
mangrove forests that extends approximately 30 km inland from the Gulf of Mexico. On 
the northern end, a ridge and slough landscape dominates, with sawgrass marshes and 
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tree islands along the ridges, and floating and submerged aquatic macrophytes in the 
sloughs (Saha et. al., 2012; Price, 2008).  
 The majority of the inflow going through the above hydrological structure and 
into the ENP (70%) flows through Shark River Slough, with the remaining inflows 
reaching Taylor Slough to the southeast (Price, 2008). More than 90% of the flow 
through SRS region discharges into the Gulf of Mexico through five major rivers along 
the southwest coast (Levesque, 2004), corresponding to zones 4, 5, and 6 of ENP (Figure 
1). Lostmans River contributes 33% of mean annual discharge, Harney River 32%, Broad 
River 17%, Shark River 14%, and North River 3%. While salinity fluctuates seasonally, 
there is an observed salinity gradient with Lostmans River at the north being saline and 
North River at the south being brackish (Woods, 1994).  
 The region’s climate is seasonal subtropical, with wet and dry seasons, and it 
rarely experiences freezing temperatures. The dry season is November through April 
(Price et al., 2008; Saha et al., 2012), during which some parts of the slough are dry. 
Average water depth during the wet season of May through October is 1 m in the 
northern extent, and increases to about 3 m in the channels draining into the Gulf of 
Mexico (Saha et al., 2012). 
2.2.2 Conceptual Model 
Figure 2 is a schematic representation of our integrated model that captures the 
relationship between the freshwater flow and the periodic total monetary value of 
recreational ecosystem services enjoyed by anglers. The model first recognizes that 
freshwater discharges that flow into the coastal creeks are a key determinant of the 
overall health of the ecosystem in general and the fishery habitat in particular. Thus, the 
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key indicators of the Everglades natural habitat quality including stage, primary fishery 
productivity, diversity, and location of fish depend on the freshwater flows (Higman, 
1967). The model then recognizes that anglers who fish in ENP value various fishery and 
non-fishery attributes as part of their fishing experience, including catch per effort and 
enjoying a healthy natural area. That is, the overall recreational value of a fishing trip to 
ENP is assumed to be comprised of multiple attributes of anglers’ experience: fishing-
specific attributes (catch rate, size of the largest keeper, fishing travel time, etc.) and 
experiencing a healthy ecosystem (Johnston et al., 2012). Finally, the model monetizes 
the average individual fishing experience by using their mean willingness to pay as a 
proxy for their recreational value and then extrapolates the same to the entire population 
of anglers. The final stage of the modeling is to develop an aggregate penalty function 
that captures the recreational ecosystem values lost as a result of maintaining periodic 
water flows below the targets. The following sub-sections explain various hydrological, 
ecological, and economic sub-components of the model. 
Hydro-ecological models 
We first developed models that link hydrology with fishery productivity and 
overall ecosystem health. We linked the fishery catches with the managed S12 structures 
flow in two steps: (i) fish productivity in SRS coastal estuaries was assumed to be a 
function of SRS freshwater outflow into coastal streams and season (see equation 1 
below) (Rudnick et al., 2005; Stabenau et al., 2011; Walters et al., 1992); and (ii) 
freshwater outflow was modeled as a function of S12 managed flow along with other 
hydrological variables related to the SRS watershed (see equation 2 below) (Saha et al., 
2012). That is, the managed flow at the northern boundary of the SRS watershed 
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indirectly affects the fish catches in the coastal areas through its effect on the freshwater 
outflows. 
Following Rudnick et al. (2005) and Stabenau et al. (2011), we assumed that 
natural freshwater outflows into the coastal creeks and overall climatic conditions 
represented by the season were the key determinants of fish productivity. We recognize 
that the relationship between fish catch and freshwater flow is complex. While the 
freshwater flow could affect the distribution of certain species, and in turn, its catch, the 
anglers that are loyal to that species may follow those fish by changing their fishing 
location, traveling longer distance, and/or spending more time fishing. As a result, they 
may not see a fall in the amount of actual catch in relation to freshwater flow. 
Unfortunately, historical data on anglers’ response in terms fishing location and travel 
distance appear to be unavailable. We partially address the data problem by defining fish 
productivity by CPUE, a measure of how many fish an angler caught per hour of fishing 
time, whether it was kept or not. In response to reduced freshwater flow, if anglers had to 
travel greater distances or spend more time to acquire a target amount of catch, the 
corresponding catch per unit effort (fishing time) would be lower than usual. 
The CPUE is calculated for each of the following five species: Snook 
(Centropomus undecimalis), Red Drum (Sciaenops ocellatus), Tarpon (Megalops 
atlantica), Gray Snapper (Lutjanus griseus), and Spotted Seatrout (Cynoscion nebulosus). 
These five species were selected after consultation with ecologists and were also among 
the top species targeted by anglers surveyed (see subsequent sections for anglers’ 
survey). We considered fishery productivity for the ENP fishing areas north of Flamingo 
and south of Chokoloskee, comprising zones 4, 5, 6S, 6C, and 6N. These zones include 
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Whitewater Bay, Shark River, Harney River, Broad River, Tarpon Bay, and Lostmans 
River.  
 𝐶𝑚 = 𝑎11𝑂𝑚 + 𝑎12𝑆1 + 𝑎13𝑆2 + 𝑎14𝑆3 + 𝜀1,   (1) 
where Cm is the catch in numbers of fish per unit of fishing effort in month m; O is the 
total surface water outflow from the SRS watershed to the southwest ENP coastal 
tributaries (KAF); 
The variables S1, S2, and S3 are the dummy variables representing the four seasons of the 
year (Winter, Spring, Summer, and Fall). As the model used time series data, the error 
term was expected to be auto-correlated. Notice that equation (1) is a simple additive 
model linking fish catches with management-induced freshwater outflows of the SRS 
estuaries. Alternative statistical relationships including logistic, double-log, saturation 
function, and quadratic forms did not fit the data as well as the linear model. One possible 
reason the logistic or other non-linear models were not a good fit was that, except during 
a handful of months, the flows during the model study period (1991-2005) were far from 
the “natural” flow targets. 
 Saha et al. (2012) computed SRS daily water surplus as a net effect of inflows, 
precipitation, and surface water losses caused by outflows, percolation, seepage, and 
evapotranspiration. The SFWMD (2005) also uses a similar daily water balance equation 
to simulate various monthly surface and ground water inputs and outputs. The purpose of 
our analysis was to link the SRS surface water outflow along western boundary (O) with 
the SRS surface inflows along the northern boundary. Childers and Leonard (2005) opine 
that the freshwater inflow through the S12 structures is the dominant factor that 
influences the freshwater discharges into the SRS coastal tributaries. Slightly modifying 
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the water balance equations in Saha et al. (2012) and SFWMD (2005), we adapted the 
following simplified hydrological equation to link coastal freshwater outflow with the 
managed inflow of freshwater along the SRS northern boundary,  
𝑂𝑚 = 𝑎21𝐹𝑚−1 + 𝑎22𝑅𝑚−1 + 𝑎23𝐿𝑚−1 + 𝜀2     (2) 
Where F is the surface water inflows from the SRS northern boundary, R is the 
precipitation, and L is the sum total of water losses from the watershed that result from 
surface outflows towards the east and south, evapotranspiration, and percolation. The 
inflow F in our model closely relates to the structural inflow from the S12 and S333 
hydrological structures, which is the decision variable that SFWMD regulates. Childers 
and Leonard (2005) found that the velocity of the freshwater flow varied between seasons 
and between slough and sawgrass ridges. They estimated the mean velocities of 0.50 cm 
sec-1 and 0.34 cm sec-1, respectively. At these velocities, we expected one to two-month 
lag between the freshwater inflow at the northern boundary and the coastal freshwater 
discharges. We estimated the coefficients of the SRS freshwater outflow equation in (2) 
with different lag periods, but found the one-month lag model to be the best fit. 
 By plugging (2) into (1), we can directly link the fishery productivity in the SRS 
coastal area with the managed SRS structural inflows (i.e., combined S12 and S333 
structural inflows) along the northern boundary of SRS. That is, we can easily show that  
𝐶𝑚 = 𝑓(𝐹𝑚−1)        (3) 
Creel surveys, taking their name from the wicker baskets anglers use to hold fish, 
target recreational anglers in a given fishery to estimate total catch and effort. The ENP 
agents have been interviewing randomly selected recreational anglers over the last 50 
years at Flamingo and Chokoloskee/Everglades City boat launch sites upon return from 
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fishing trips on weekends and on some weekdays. Data gathered include the area fished, 
number of fish kept and released, time expended, and species preference (Osborne et al., 
2006). Using this data, we computed CPUE by taking the ratio of the number of fish 
caught by each angler to effort expended by that angler in hours. Specifically, the CPUE 
was computed as the total number of fish caught (kept and released) by all anglers in a 
trip divided by total time expended (hours fished by those anglers). That is, 
𝐶𝑃𝑈𝐸 =
𝐾𝑒𝑝𝑡 +  𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 ×  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝
 
Finally, C for a given species and month was computed by taking the average of 
species-specific CPUEs of all the anglers surveyed during that month. 
The data on hydrological variables in equation (1) and (2) were obtained by 
running the South Florida Water Management Model (SFWMM) exclusively for the SRS 
watershed. SFWMM is a physically-based regional-scale simulation model that combines 
the hydrology and management aspects of water resources from Lake Okeechobee to 
Florida Bay (South Florida Water Management District, 2005). The model is often 
referred to as the 2x2, as it has a 2-mile by 2-mile fixed-resolution grid system covering 
an area of 7,600 square miles. Major components of South Florida’s hydrologic cycle are 
simulated on a daily continuous mode using climatic data for the 1965-2005 period-of-
record. Components include rainfall, evapotranspiration, surface and groundwater flow, 
seepage, and percolation.  
Previous recreational studies (Johnston et al., 2011; Schultz, Johnston, Segerson, 
& Besedin, 2012), our own consultation with user groups, and our preliminary survey of 
ENP anglers revealed that recreational anglers do value the overall health of the natural 
area. But as may be expected, there is no single indicator that fully captures the health or 
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integrity of an entire ecosystem and thus could function as a metric of restoration success. 
For instance, Ogden et al. (2014) recommended using the abundance of a suite of 
waterbirds as an indicator of ecosystem health in the coastal marine environment of 
South Florida, while Harvey et al. (2012) and Mazzotti et al. (2008) concluded that 
American alligator abundance is “an indicator of ecosystem responses to Everglades 
restoration because it is sensitive to hydrology, salinity, and system productivity, all 
factors that are expected to change as a result of restoration.” The Science Coordination 
Team of the South Florida Restoration Task Force established by the U.S. Congress has 
recommended eleven system-wide ecological indicators in order to understand how the 
ecosystem is responding to management efforts under the CERP 
(http://141.232.10.32/pm/recover/perf_ge.aspx). These indicators include abundance of 
crocodilians, fish and macroinvertebrates, periphyton invasive species, and aquatic 
vegetation, among others (Brandt et al., 2012; Doren et al., 2009). While there appears to 
be considerable disagreement among scientists as to which indicator, or group of 
indicators, best describes the ecosystem responses, there is certainly agreement on the 
fact that all of these indicators have strong dependencies on hydrological conditions, 
particularly the extent, duration, and timing of marsh flooding (Holling et al., 1994; 
Ogden et al., 2005). The dependency is captured by the inundation pattern or hydroperiod 
of wetlands, as told by marsh depth. For instance, the availability of water during both the 
wet and dry seasons seems to be the limiting factor for species sustainability and recovery 
of oysters, spoonbills, pink shrimp, submersed aquatic vegetation, and crocodilians 
(Brandt et al., 2012). Insufficient water and rapid reversals in water height either during 
marsh flooding or draining have kept many of the eleven indicators below targets.  
16 
 
For lack of a single comprehensive ecological benefit-relevant indicator, we used 
the water depth (Dm) as a proxy for the overall ecosystem health. Further, in order to keep 
the model simple, we considered the above depth-ecohealth relationship only for below-
target flow levels, although excess water level could also disrupt wildlife habitat (Brandt 
et al., 2012). Depth variable data from four observation stations along SRS was averaged 
using a data set extending from January 2002 to December 2014. Depth was assumed to 
be the function of surface water inflows through the hydrological structures along the 
northern SRS boundary (Fm); rainfall (Rm); and the sum total of various losses (Lm) 
including lateral outflows of the SRS watershed in all directions, evapotranspiration, and 
percolation. Unlike CPUE (Equation [3]), depth is modeled using seasonal (quarterly) 
time series variables, thus no lag is assumed. Formally, 
𝐷𝑚 = 𝑎31𝐹𝑚 + 𝑎32𝑅𝑚 + 𝑎33𝐿𝑚 + 𝜀3,     (4) 
where m here refers to quarter.  
 The depth variable in the above equation refers to the level of the water surface 
with respect to a given gage datum, in this case NAVD 88. The datum is used as a zero 
point for measurement of water level. The zero point may not correspond exactly to the 
ground surface elevation at a given location (Holmes Jr. et al., 2001). For example, a 
location may have an elevation of 4.01 ft above NAVD 88, and a stage of 4.65 ft. 
Consequently, water depth is calculated as the difference between water level and 
elevation. Daily median water depth for four stations along Shark Slough (MO-215, 
NP206, P33, and P34) was averaged and used to calculate mean monthly water depth.  
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We detected the presence of first-order autocorrelation in the error terms of all the 
three hydro-ecological models (equations 1, 2, and 4). We resolved the autocorrelation 
problem by using the Cochrane-Orcutt Procedure (Cochrane and Orcutt, 1949). In all but 
one case, the serial correlation was removed after the first round of transformation of 
model variables. Only in the case of equation 4 (the depth-flow model), we had to apply 
the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation twice. 
Penalty function development   
The penalty in our study is defined as the periodic loss in the recreation-related 
ecosystem services suffered by anglers when the freshwater inflows in SRS falls below 
certain target levels (a management decision or natural shortage of water), or because of 
changes in natural factors such as rainfall, evapotranspiration, and outflows in the SRS 
watershed itself. Since the focus of our study is the effect of managing inflows at the SRS 
northern structures (S12+S333), we construct the penalty function in relation to the flow 
shortages at those structures in relation to certain target flows. These target flows are 
derived from the Natural System Model (NSM) (VanZee, 1999), a simulation model that 
is maintained and run by the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) to 
characterize pre-development hydrologic conditions of the Everglades system. The NSM-
based target flows therefore mimic natural hydrologic conditions prior to channelization 
projects and associated hydrologic alterations in the area in the early 1900s. Later in the 
paper, we will see that the targets are significantly higher than the average flows since 
1990s and even larger than the average flows in much recent years (2012-14). 
Let 𝐹𝑚
𝑘 be the current monthly SRS inflow at S12+S333 structures, and 𝐶𝑚
𝑘  be the 
current levels of fish catch. Express the flow-induced catch rate 𝐶𝑚 = 𝑓(𝐹𝑚−1) of a 
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species during a given month as percent change from its current level of catch 𝐶𝑚
𝑘  as, 
 ∆𝐶𝑚 = 100 [
𝐶𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1)−𝐶𝑚
𝑘  
𝐶𝑚
𝑘  
]       (5) 
Define 𝑤𝑐 as the marginal WTP of anglers for a percent change in catch, which will be 
described later in the discrete choice model. Then  
∆𝑌𝑐,𝑚 = 𝑤𝑐∆𝐶𝑚,        (6) 
where 𝑌𝑐,𝑚 is the hypothetical monetary value of the overall recreational fishery catch 
and ∆𝑌𝑐,𝑚 is the monetary value of the change in catch rate ∆𝐶𝑚 valued at $𝑤𝑐 per 
percent change. 
The variable ∆𝑌𝑐,𝑚 can also be interpreted as the additional price that an average angler 
would be willing to pay over and above the value that he or she is enjoying at the current 
catch rate (𝑌𝑐
𝑘). That is, 
∆𝑌𝑐,𝑚 = 𝑌𝑐,𝑚 − 𝑌𝑐
𝑘        (7) 
Equating (6) and (7), substituting in (5) for ∆𝐶𝑚, and simplifying the results, we obtain, 
𝑌𝑐,𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1) = 𝑌𝑐
𝑘 − 100𝑤𝑐 +
100𝑤𝑐
𝐶𝑚
𝑘 𝐶𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1)    (8) 
Let 𝑎𝑚be the number of anglers’ trips in month m and 𝑍𝑐,𝑚 the total recreational fishery 
catch value from all trips. Therefore, we express 𝑍𝑐,𝑚 as,  
𝑍𝑐,𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1) = 𝑎𝑚𝑌𝑐,𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1)      (9) 
Note that 𝑍𝑐,𝑚 is an increasing function of freshwater inflow. We can now formulate the 
total fishery catch penalty [𝑃𝑐,𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1)] of not meeting the monthly target flow as,  
 𝑃𝑐,𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1) = 𝑍𝑐,𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1
𝑡 ) − 𝑍𝑐,𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1),     (10) 
where 𝐹𝑚−1
𝑡  is the flow target in m-1. Figure 3 represents equation (10) where in the 
amount total penalty decreases as the volume of flow increases, and the penalty reaches 
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zero when the inflow volume reaches the monthly target. We assume zero penalty for 
𝐹𝑚−1 > 𝐹𝑚−1
𝑡 . 
By substituting (8) into (9) and the results into (10), we can further simplify fishery catch 
penalty function as,  
𝑃𝑐,𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1) = 100𝑎𝑚𝑤𝑐 [
𝐶𝑚
𝑡 (𝐹𝑚−1
𝑡 )−𝐶𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1)
𝐶𝑚
𝑘 (𝐹𝑚−1
𝑘 )
]    (11) 
Note that 𝑃𝑐,𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1) is the difference between catch rates at the target flow (𝐹𝑚−1
𝑡 ) and 
the actual flow (𝐹𝑚−1) for a given month, weighted by the catch rate at the current flow 
(𝐹𝑚−1
𝑘 ), and multiplied by the value of a percent change in catch (𝑤𝑐) and the number of 
total trips (𝑎𝑚) for the given month. Penalty is lagged by a period because of the lagged 
catch-flow relationship in (3). Also, the flow-induced shortage in catch in (11), 
𝐶𝑚
𝑡 (𝐹𝑚−1
𝑡 ) − 𝐶𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1), is above weighted by the current catch rate 𝐶𝑚
𝑘 (𝐹𝑚−1
𝑘 ). 
Weighting is done because the WTP value in the above equation, 𝑤𝑐, reflects the average 
angler’s willingness to pay for a percent improvement in catch from the current fish catch 
rate. 
While anglers target different species during fishing trips, their preference may 
vary from species to species. As there are five major species, 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,5, we can obtain 
the aggregate catch penalty function [𝑃𝑐,𝑚
𝑎 (𝐹𝑚−1)] as a weighted average of individual 
species catch penalties, 
𝑃𝑐,𝑚
𝑎 (𝐹𝑚−1)  = ∑ 𝜔𝑖 {100𝑎𝑚𝑤𝑐 [
𝐶𝑖,𝑚
𝑡 (𝐹𝑚−1
𝑡 )−𝐶𝑖,𝑚(𝐹𝑚−1)
𝐶𝑖,𝑚
𝑘 (𝐹𝑚−1
𝑘 )
]}5𝑖=1 ,   (12) 
where 𝜔𝑖 is the weight of the species i in terms of anglers’ preference given to it during 
the fishing trip. We require that 
∑ 𝜔𝑖
5
𝑖=1 = 1          
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 As mentioned before, the water depth in ENP is the key driver of the overall 
health of the ecosystem. A change in the 𝐷𝑚 variable from the target condition is 
considered as an indication of change in ecosystem health. Recall equation (4) which 
connects the water depth [𝐷𝑚(𝐹𝑚)] to water management, i.e., managed flow variable, 
𝐹𝑚. We used this equation (4) to link reductions in managed flow from the target level to 
proportionate changes in the depth variable, and in turn, to proportionate changes in 
overall ecosystem health using the ratio, 
𝐷𝑚
𝑡 (𝐹𝑚
𝑡 )−𝐷𝑚(𝐹𝑚)
𝐷𝑚
𝑘 (𝐹𝑚
𝑘 )
. We recognize that this is a 
simple and broad measure of ecological outcome of a management action. In actuality, 
indicators of overall ecosystem health may vary from turbidity and seagrass density to 
presence of particular species of wading birds and alligators and healthy mangroves 
(Brandt et al., 2012). Further, the above ratio is only a linear and instantaneous 
representation of ecohealth-flow response while the actual ecosystem response could be 
non-linear, especially over the long term. Measurement and valuation of more complex 
ecological functions and service outcomes of management flow are beyond the scope of 
our study. As the focus of our analysis was the valuation of ecosystem services that were 
relevant to common users like recreational anglers, it was necessary to keep the measure 
simple and meaningful to foster better grasp of the measure by the anglers and others. 
Following Johnston et al. (2012) and Mitchell and Carson (1989), to quantify both 
intermediate and final ecosystem services, overall ecosystem health was included as a 
“holistic measure of the ecosystem condition in survey scenarios to quantify this final 
ecosystem service.”  
The ecosystem health penalty [𝑃𝑒,𝑚(𝐹𝑚)] is expressed as the dollar value of the 
percentage change in the depth variable [𝐷𝑚(𝐹𝑚)], i.e.,  
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𝑃𝑒,𝑚(𝐹𝑚) = 100𝑎𝑚𝑤𝑒 [
𝐷𝑚
𝑡 (𝐹𝑚
𝑡 )−𝐷𝑚(𝐹𝑚)
𝐷𝑚
𝑘 (𝐹𝑚
𝑘 )
],    (13) 
where 𝑤𝑒 is the average angler’s willingness to pay in dollars for a percent improvement 
in the overall ecosystem health (e) from the current level. 
 Combining equations (12) and (13), we compute the total penalty for the fisheries 
ecosystem services as the sum total of the penalties for lost fish catch and the lost overall 
ecosystem health due to reduced SRS inflows. That is, 
 𝑃𝑇,𝑚(𝐹𝑚) = 𝑃𝑐,𝑚+1(𝐹𝑚) + 𝑃𝑒,𝑚(𝐹𝑚)     (14) 
Non-market Valuation of Anglers Recreational Attributes  
In order to estimate the anglers’ WTP values for changes in recreational fishery 
attributes, we adapted a discrete choice model (Vojáček and Pecáková 2010), which 
complies with utility maximization and random utility theory (Lancaster 1966; de Palma 
2008). Beginning with a standard random utility specification, an angler is asked to 
choose among three hypothetical restoration scenarios (r = N, R1, R2) for ENP ecosystem 
service restoration. These include a status quo (N) option with no restoration and low or 
no cost and two restoration options (R1, R2). Each scenario is characterized by a vector of 
variables, Q = [X1 . . . XJ], representing scenario outcomes. X1 . . . XJ-1 are defined as 
variables representing ecological outcomes of restoration, A represents unavoidable cost, 
and S represents a vector of demographic variables. Following standard notation, that the 
utility agent derives from option r can be represented as  
 𝑈𝑟(𝑄, 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) = 𝑉𝑟(𝑄, 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀𝑟     (15) 
where I is the disposable income of angler; Vr(.) is a function representing the empirically 
measurable component of utility; and 𝜀𝑟 is the unobservable stochastic component of 
utility modeled as econometric error. When presented with a set of scenarios r = R1, R2, 
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an agent is assumed to choose the one from which he or she derives the greatest expected 
utility (Train 2009). That is, an agent would say YES to paying an amount A for an 
environmental improvement if  
 𝑉1(𝑄1, 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀1 ≥ 𝑉0(𝑄0, 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀0    (16) 
An agent’s WTP is determined by a variety of socioeconomic factors including income, 
education, and knowledge and use of the resource in question. Thus an important 
consideration with stated preference is the respondent’s information set, which consists of 
both endogenous factors because of experience or familiarity with the resource and 
exogenous factors as a result of explicit information presented in the survey instrument 
(Cameron and Englin 1997; Bergstrom 1990; Freeman 1994). To help ensure agents 
made informed decisions, a number of multimedia tools were used within the anglers’ 
survey in our study. Two videos, each approximately 1 minute in length, were employed, 
as were maps of the Everglades and Florida Bay, graphic illustrations, photographs, and 
text descriptions. 
Following the theoretical model, the structure of the discrete choice experiment 
had respondents choose from three scenarios (r = N, R1, R2) for restoration of freshwater 
flow. The questionnaire was developed and tested over one year in a collaborative 
process that included the participation of economists, ecologists, hydrologists, and 
members of stakeholder groups, ensuring that relevant attributes were considered 
(Johnston et al. 2012, Schultz et al. 2012). Respondents were presented with a choice 
card in which they were asked to select their preferred scenario, valuing percent changes 
in various fishery attributes and the overall ecological condition from the current level. 
Johnston et al. (2012) stress the need that a stated preference survey include a 
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comprehensive set of indicators representing both direct and indirect outcomes of 
management policy that would contribute to respondents’ welfare. Failure to do so 
conveys an ‘ambiguous’ ecological description of services to the survey respondents. The 
misrepresentation is characterized as a violation of content validity (Mitchell and Carson, 
1989), which could lead respondents to conflate or over speculate the welfare values of 
those direct indicators (e.g., fish catch, travel distance, etc.) included in the survey 
(Johnston et al., 2012). To avoid such conflating effect, the choice options in our survey 
included three attributes characterizing fishing-specific experience (catch rate, size of the 
largest keeper, and travel distance for fishing) and one attribute representing the overall 
ecological effect of restoration. We also had the usual price attribute characterizing 
individual per-trip cost. The combination of distinct fishery-specific and broader 
ecological indicators will allow respondents to value each of them distinctly. On all 
choice cards, Scenario I represented the status-quo at low or no additional cost, and 
Scenarios II and III represented maintaining or improvement of current levels at an 
increased cost. 
Levels for each attribute in the experimental design were assigned using feasible 
outcomes identified by ecological models and expert consultations. Choice scenarios 
represented each attribute in relative terms with respect to current conditions, 
representing a percent change. Table 1 presents different levels chosen for each attribute. 
A fractional factorial experimental design was used to minimize correlation for a choice 
model covariance matrix, and the final design consisted of 180 choice profiles blocked 
into 60 cards (Kuhfeld, 2010; Kuhfeld and Tobias, 2005; Johnston et al., 2013). The  
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survey was implemented using the online Qualtrics platform, and analysis included 600 
completed surveys.  
The parameters of the random utility discrete choice model in (16) was estimated 
using the simulated-likelihood mixed logic with Halton draws. As respondents had 
multiple responses, the model was specified to allow for correlation across their 
respective responses in the panel data (Johnston et al., 2012). Fixed coefficients were 
those for catch rate and overall ecosystem health, while size of the largest keeper, travel 
distance, and additional cost were specified to have random coefficients. Alternative 
specifications of fixed and random coefficients were attempted before choosing the final 
model. For instance, we tried a nested logit model as well as models with demographic 
variables interacting with various attributes. None of those models yielded significant 
results for the cost parameter. Using the estimated model parameters, we were able to 
compute the mean WTP of ENP anglers for percent improvements in fish catch (𝑤𝑐) and 
overall ecosystem health (𝑤𝑒). Following standard practice (Hole, 2006; Johnston et al., 
2013), the WTP estimates were expressed as the ratios of attribute coefficients to the cost 
coefficient. Further, the ENP anglers online survey also provided other useful 
information such as anglers’ preference for various species, from which we estimated 
species weights (𝜔𝑖) and used in aggregating the catch-related penalties of model species 
in equation (12).   
Estimation of Monthly Recreational Trips 
The penalty function in (9) requires the latest (2015) estimate of the fishing effort 
in terms of the number of fishing vehicles in the ENP. Osborne et al. (2006) provided 
historical fishing trip data from 1978 through 2005 in areas 1 to 6 of the ENP, which 
25 
 
mostly overlap our study recreational area. During 1978 through 2005 the number of 
annual recreational vehicles (A) ranged from 32,000 (1978) to 38,500 (2005) for the 
above ENP management areas. In order to estimate 2015 value of A, we estimated the 
following annual vehicle trip model, representing the fishing effort. The variable A was 
assumed as a function of the number of registered recreational vessels in the region 
(RRV) and the U.S. consumer confidence index (CCI). Formally, the estimating equation 
for annual ENP fishing vessel trip was, 
𝐴 = 𝑎40 + 𝑎41𝑅𝑅𝑉 + 𝑎42𝐶𝐶𝐼 + 𝜀4     (17) 
The RRV is an indicator of the overall demand for recreational activities in the region, 
which we measure using the annual number of recreational vessels registered in Miami 
Dade, Broward, Palm Beach, Monroe, and Collier counties. These data are available from 
the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (FDHSMV, 2017). The 
CCI variable represents the people’s overall financial ability to engage in recreational 
activities. The University of Michigan (2017) develops this index and makes it available 
through the Federal Reserve of St. Louis website. We also tried including Florida’s 
population, which was highly correlated with RRV and therefore was dropped from the 
model. The Durbin-Watson test statistic showed that the error term 𝜀4 was serially 
correlated. We corrected the model from autocorrelation using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
Procedure. The estimated model was used to project the annual number of trips for 2015. 
Total annual fishing trips were further distributed to different months using the seasonal 
recreational boat distributions estimated by Ault et al. (2008) using an aerial survey of 
recreational vessels and trailers in ENP waters and parking lots, respectively. 
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Shortage in freshwater delivery, depth, and CPUEs. 
The current water delivery fell short of the target significantly in the recent years 
(2012-2014) and the deficit was the highest during the months of March through May 
(68.3%) and the lowest during the months of September through November (46.1%) 
(Table 2 and Figure 4). The lowest and highest deficits were found to occur during the 
months of October and April, respectively. Throughout the study period of 1991 to 2014, 
actual flow typically came closest to target flow during the wet season, in line with the 
increased precipitation during those months. The only months in which flow exceeded 
the target in any year were January 1995, February 1993 and 1995, May 1993, October 
1995, and December 1994. The years 1993 and 1995 had the highest levels of flow 
averaging across all months. The average water depth estimated at the recent average 
SRS inflows (2012-2014 levels) consistently fell short of the depth to be expected if the 
freshwater SRS inflow were to be maintained at the target levels. The shortage varied 
from 82.5% during the months of December through February to 94.5% during the 
months of September through November.  
 The estimated catch per unit effort (in fish h-1) were the highest during the 
summer season (June through August) for all five model species, with 0.37 for snook, 
0.29 for redfish, 0.22 for tarpon, 0.77 for snapper, and 0.72 for seatrout. Ault et al. (2008) 
estimated that the total number of fishing vehicles found in the ENP during the same 
season was the lowest of all seasons, i.e., only 13.3 percent of the total annual 
recreational vehicles estimated for the National Park. It was interesting to note that the 
highest fish productivity was observed when the fishing intensity was the lowest. 
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However, anglers had suffered deficits in CPUEs for all model species and for all seasons 
when comparing the model based CPUE at target flow levels to current conditions. The 
lowest estimated deficits were in the summer months (June through August), probably 
the result the more than average monthly rainfall during these months compared with the 
rest of the year in addition to lower fishing intensity. On average, seatrout had 
experienced the lowest CPUE deficit (27%) while redfish had suffered the highest deficit 
(41%). 
The CPUEs for most study species were fairly constant from 1991 to 2002 across 
both wet and dry seasons, when snook saw a nearly threefold increase from 2002 until 
2009. An extreme cold event in 2010 led to a die-off of snook, with a corresponding 
increase in CPUE for red drum, possibly caused by decreased predation of juveniles by 
snook (Boucek and Rehage, 2013; Hallac et al., 2010) or possibly because anglers 
switched their effort to red drum. By 2013, all species were returning to previous CPUE 
with a slight upward trend for snapper. 
2.3.2 Catch-flow and Stage-flow Relationships 
  The results of the hydro-biological models are presented in Table 3. All of the 
model coefficients were statistically significant and had expected signs. The measure of 
goodness of fit (R2 value) was higher than 0.4 for all models. The catch-flow model 
results indicate that surface water discharges from the SRS into the coastal tributaries are 
the strong determinant of the productivities of the model species. The catch variables 
were also found to be strongly influenced the seasonal dummy variables. The fall season 
was used as a trap variable. The catches in all other seasons were significantly higher 
28 
 
than the fall season catches. These results are fairly consistent with results from previous 
studies (Rutherford et al., 1989a, 1989b; Tilmant et al., 1989). 
As expected, the SRS freshwater inflow was found to have a positive influence on 
the average water depth in the downstream watershed. Other variables in the model, 
rainfall, and all types of losses (i.e., evapotranspiration, percolation, and all lateral 
outflows combined) also significantly affected the water depth. Finally, the hydrological 
model, SRS outflow-inflow function, also showed strong results. The effects of SRS 
inflow and precipitation on SRS discharges were found to be positive, while the 
relationship between all watershed losses (i.e., evapotranspiration, percolation, and lateral 
surface water losses) was found to be negative. Again, these results are consistent with 
the wetland hydrology in general (Dolan et al., 1984) and SRS hydrology in particular 
(Saha et al, 2014). By combining the results of the last model [equation (4)] with those of 
catch-flow functions [equation (1)], we can link the fish productivity in the coastal SRS 
creeks with the SRS northern freshwater inflow, the main management variable of our 
interest. The integration of the two models will allow us to analyze the effects of changes 
in freshwater management in SRS on fishery ecosystem system services.  
2.3.3 Discrete choice model and annual fishing trips 
 Table 4 presents the results of the mixed logit random utility discrete choice 
model of recreational preference. The coefficients of catch and overall ecosystem health 
were specified as fixed whereas the coefficients of other three attribute variables were 
specified as random with a normal distribution. We had tried several alternative 
specifications with different combinations of fixed and random coefficients (Johnston et 
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al., 2012), but chose the one that gave the best results based on statistical significance. 
All estimated coefficients statistically significant with signs as hypothesized.  
As specified in our choice experiment, the coefficients of all attribute variables 
except the cost variable represent the marginal utility of anglers of increasing or 
decreasing the attribute levels by a percentage point from their respective reference 
levels, which in our study reflect the levels for the period when the anglers’ survey was 
conducted, i.e., 2014-2015. The study results indicated that the marginal utility of overall 
ecosystem health was positive and the greatest of all experiment attributes, followed by 
the marginal utility of percent change in the size of the keeper or harvest. It is not 
surprising that sports fishery anglers would care about the size of their keepers (Osborne 
et al., 2006). The results also showed that the longer the distance that the anglers had to 
travel for fishing, the less likely that they would choose that plan. That is, anglers 
suffered disutility with increase in travel distance. Finally, the sign of the coefficient of 
the cost variable was consistent with our expectation indicating that a restoration plan 
with increased freshwater was less likely chosen if the costs were higher. 
 Table 4 also presents the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) or implicit price of 
model choice attributes that are associated with increasing freshwater flow in ENP. 
Marginal willingness to pay can be calculated by taking the ratio of the coefficient of a 
given attribute variable to the coefficient of the cost variable. As expected, an average 
angler was willing to pay the highest amount for improving the overall ecosystem health 
at $3.44 per percent improvement, given all other variables constant. The $3.44 was 
followed by the MWTP for percent improvement in the size of the keepers ($1.64), a 
percent reduction in travel distance ($1.58), and a percent improvement in catch ($1.28). 
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Note that these implicit price estimates of recreational attributes were derived from 
clearly and unambiguously specified ecological characteristics with quantitative 
measurements (i.e., in percent changes). The survey had asked anglers if they would pay 
a given bid amount for a specific (quantitative) percent of improvement in the overall 
ecosystem health. Therefore, these estimates are likely to be more precise and reliable 
(Johnston et al., 2012). However, we do recognize the limitation of this method in that 
anglers were not told what a given percentage improvement in the ecosystem health 
meant in terms of detailed specifications of system-wide ecosystem indicators (Brand et 
al., 2012). Anglers were left to make their own subjective judgement of the ecosystem 
improvement. 
 The annual fishing trip model which was estimated using the ENP fishing trip 
data that was available from 1978 to 2005 (Table 3). Both RRV and CCI variables were 
highly significant determinants of the annual fishing trips. In recent years, both these 
variables have increased. Using the model parameters and the available estimates of the 
2015 registered recreational vessels and reported US confidence index numbers, we 
estimated the annual 2015 trips at 44,627. This estimate indicated a moderate 16 percent 
increase in annual trips over the ten-year period beginning in 2005, which saw 38,284 
trips. Based on aerial survey data given by Ault et al. (2008) for weekend and weekday 
samples of fishing boats, we estimated the seasonal distribution of total annual fishing 
trips to ENP at 17.47% for Fall, 33.04% for Winter, 36.20% for Spring, and 13.29% for 
Summer. We then equally allocated one-third of each season’s percent of fishing trips to 
each of the three months of that season. The 2015 estimated annual trip of 44,627 was 
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further allocated to all 12 months of the year. Accordingly, the three Summer months had 
the lowest number of trips and the three Winter months had the highest number of trips.  
2.3.4 Fisheries penalty functions 
 We used equations (12) to (14) to generate the monthly penalty values with 
respect to varying levels of freshwater flow at SRS norther boundary through S12 and 
S333 structures. Table 5 presents the monthly functions. The penalty values are the lost 
dollar values in recreational experience as a result of shortage in freshwater delivery into 
SRS in relation to monthly target levels. The penalty reaches zero at the monthly target 
level. The height of the penalty function varies across the months. During the dry months, 
November through April, the penalty was found to be high for any given level of flow, 
whereas during the wet months, May through October, the penalty was found to be 
smaller than it was in the dry season. Three factors contributed to this variation. During 
the wet season, the reduction in water shortages in relation to the target delivery reduced 
the penalty. Also during those months, especially in the Fall, the total number of monthly 
fishing trips declined. On the contrary, during the rest of the years, either the flow 
shortage, the number of trips or both were relatively lower than the levels in the dry 
season.  
 The slope of the downward sloping penalty curve represents the implicit marginal 
cost of reducing the water delivery or reallocating the water for upstream uses. The same 
can be interpreted as the marginal value of increasing the water delivery into ENP in 
terms of avoided loss in recreational value, i.e., the marginal value of water use for 
recreation and fishery habitat protection. The monthly recreation marginal value of water 
ranged from a lowest amount of $11.88 per acre-feet (AF) to $112.11 AF-1 (Table 5). 
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Basically, they mirrored the extent of seasonal water shortage and the seasonal recreation 
demand. The mean annual marginal value (or implicit price) of water was estimated to be 
$41.08 AF-1. The major portion of the value can be attributed to the value that anglers 
attach to overall ecosystem health ($39.36 AF-1), while a significantly small portion can 
be attributed to the value anglers attach to fish catch.  
The implicit values of water for various uses are not readily available. Frederick 
et al. (1997) reported water prices in different US economic sectors in 1994 US$. By 
inflating those values to 2015 using a cumulative inflation rate of 59.9%, we found that 
their mean estimate of water price for recreation was $76.77 AF-1 in 2015 US dollars. 
This value was within the range of the monthly water price estimates obtained in this 
study. Frederick et al. came up with higher values of water for agriculture ($119.95 AF-1), 
industry ($451.00 AF-1), and domestic ($310.27 AF-1) uses than for recreational uses 
($76.77 AF-1). Our current study was a part of a broad regional research on water 
resources allocation in South Florida (Mirchi et al., 2018). Two other studies under this 
broad regional project looked at the value of water for urban and agriculture uses in 
South Florida. Takatsuka et al. (2018) estimated a much larger value of water at $280 AF-
1 for agricultural production, whereas Weisskoff (2018) estimated a marginal price of 
$2,000 AF-1 for urban uses at about 10% shortfall. South Florida sub-tropical agriculture 
is known for commercial cash crops such as nurseries, fruit crops, winter vegetables, 
sugarcane, and citrus. Therefore, one can expect a much higher marginal value of water 
for use in agriculture than in recreation. Similarly, the fast-growing urban population, real 
estate, and other businesses tend to push up the value of urban water use. 
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2.3.5 Simulation of water management scenarios 
Table 6 presents the total annual losses in recreational values under alternative 
water management scenarios. We estimated the total annual penalty values under the 
baseline and six alternative scenarios. The baseline scenario occurs when the monthly 
water delivery continues under the current flow rates, which amounted to annual total 
delivery of 754 KAF. The total penalty was estimated at $25.74 million. The total value 
is decomposed into two recreational attributes of fish catch at $4.16 million and overall 
ecosystem health at $21.57 million. We also estimated penalties under six other 
alternative water delivery scenarios. If the freshwater delivery were to be increased by 
50% during all the months (scenario 1), the total annual penalty would be lowered to 
$22.13 million (a 13.23% reduction in the penalty).  
Oftentimes, water management delivery decisions are made for a shorter period of 
time. Therefore, the next two scenarios considered increase in water flow only a half of 
the year. Under scenario 2, we increased the flow by 50% only during the dry season, 
which resulted in the reduction of the losses to $63.37 million, representing 7.92% 
improvement in avoided losses. Whereas under scenario 3, if we increased water delivery 
during wet season by 50%, the reduction in recreational losses was much smaller, i.e., 
penalty was reduced to $65.12 million, representing only 5.37% gain from the baseline 
penalty. This supports our observations made earlier in the paper that water is more 
valuable in dry season in terms of providing recreational services.  
Two other scenarios 4 and 5 were explored for increasing the monthly freshwater 
flows to the historical levels (an annual total of 1040 KAF) and by 100 percent of the 
baseline level (an annual total of 1509 KAF), respectively. While target flow levels are 
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ideal levels to achieve, these two scenarios, along with scenarios 1, 2, and 3, simply 
reflect incremental policy changes in the quest towards the target flows. Annual flow 
level of 1991-2005 (simulation 4) is in fact slightly higher than the baseline (2012-14) 
level (754 KAF) and drastically lower than the target (2,594 KAF). The annual total 
penalties were reduced to $21.52 million (15.75% improvement) and $18.55 million 
(26.58% improvement) under scenarios 4 and 5, respectively. By default, if the water 
delivery were to be restored at the target levels (i.e., to the annual total of 2590 KAF) 
under scenario 6, the penalty would be completely eliminated. This shows that how far 
away the current and even the historical water deliveries were from the target, and the 
respective losses in recreational value were quite substantial on an annual basis. 
However, we must note that the target levels, determined by the water management 
agencies, reflect the pre-development water flows. On the other hand, the post-
development levels used in the above analysis (scenario 4) refer to the monthly and 
annual averages for the last 25 years. While the actual flow levels in some of the months 
during the last 25 year period had reached the respective target levels, restoring the flow 
to pre-development (target) levels seems unrealistic under the current natural and 
political environment (i.e., due to the competition from other sectors). The target levels 
therefore represent at best historic reference levels rather than realistic management 
goals. For this reason, the comparison of penalties between various management 
scenarios, all of which have the same reference (i.e., target) levels, makes more 
meaningful. 
 
 
35 
 
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
An important practical insight became evident from the WTP estimates of various 
attributes. ENP anglers attached the highest value to improvements in the overall 
ecosystem health. The case for restoration of freshwater flow in ENP is not just important 
for improving the fishery habitat (Davis et al., 2005; Chen and Twilley, 1999; Ross et al., 
2000). Everglades National Park provides a host of ecosystem services including 
groundwater recharge, wildlife habitat, carbon sequestration, and mangroves-related 
services, among others (Richardson et al., 2014; Jerath et al., 2016). Our study clearly 
shows that recreational anglers do attach highest value on non-fishing related attributes. 
While the primary focus of anglers during fishing trip may be to catch and harvest as 
many fish and travel only a reasonable distance to do so, they enjoy other attributes that 
are indicative of a healthy ecosystem.  
As Johnston et al. (2012) note, one of the major limitations of past discrete choice 
or contingent valuation studies of recreational fisheries is to grossly oversimplify other 
ecological improvements of a restoration plan (e.g., defining the improvements in low, 
medium, and high levels). By doing so, the estimates of WTP for fishery improvements 
could be overestimated as respondents may bundle their value for other ecological 
aspects of improvements with fishery improvements. Johnston et al. (2012), therefore, 
used a single composite ecohealth index in addition to fish catch, access, and economic 
attributes. The WTP for the catch variable turned out be very insignificant upon including 
the ecohealth indicator variable in their survey. In our study, we used the depth variable 
as a proxy for ecohealth. Anglers were asked to value percent increase in ecohealth, 
without being given specific details on the improvements of eleven system-wide 
36 
 
ecological indicators (Brandt et al., 2012). Interestingly, with a quantitative value 
attribution to the overall ecosystem health variable, the WTP value for fishery catch 
turned out to be small but significant in our analysis. All in all, we find our estimates to 
be ecologically unambiguous and quantitatively more precise than it would have been 
without the ecohealth attribute. 
The integrated hydro-ecological-economic model developed in our study is 
probably the first attempt at linking water management variables with Everglades 
ecosystem services relevant to humans. Although our study considers a single ecosystem 
service component of ENP, and thus, may seem limited in scope, the approach has 
potential to assess management decisions in an incremental fashion (Fulford et al., 2016). 
Past valuation studies on the Everglades ecosystem restoration projects have attempted to 
measure a larger number of ecosystem services as a bundle of outcomes resulting from 
large single investment decisions (Richardson et al., 2014; McCormick et al., 2010). 
While such studies do provide management-relevant information, linking users’ 
preference and behavior explicitly with decision variables yields a powerful management 
tool. Our model, therefore, has a variety of management applications for water 
management, not only in ENP, but in other ecosystems dependent on water delivery. The 
model outcome also lends itself to being an integral component of larger multi-sector 
optimization models that examine the trade-offs among competing water uses such as 
environmental restoration; urban use and flood control; and agricultural use. (Mirchi et 
al., 2018). Further, modeling the avoided losses in economic benefit resulting from 
incremental increases in freshwater flow allows for evaluation and comparison of 
restoration scenarios, contributing to benefit-cost analyses.  
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For instance, SFWMD had considered a number of alternative water delivery 
plans for South Florida in recent years. In the case of the 2008 Modified Water Deliveries 
to ENP, Tamiami Trail Modifications, Limited Reevaluation Report (LRR) plan, a 1-mile 
bridge, other road improvements, and modifications to increase head in the L-29 canal 
would allow peak freshwater flows into the park at 47% higher rates than current 
conditions (National Park Service, 2012). The LRR bridge project was completed in 
2013. At a 47% increase from the current flow level of 1,848 cubic feet per second (cfs) 
(National Park Service, 2012) to the project goal level of 4,000 cfs, the penalty value of 
the recreational fishing experience would be lowered by 13% (derived from the scenario 
1 analysis). 
One of the significant contributions of this study is to quantify implicit prices of 
water for recreation and habitat protection. To our knowledge, such information is very 
scare in the literature. See Frederick et al. (1997) for a most comprehensive list of water 
prices, which are more than 20 years old. We consider the price estimates in our study to 
be very conservative since we were able to account for only one major ecosystem value, 
i.e., anglers’ preference for fishing and habitat protection. Other ecosystem service values 
must be measured and linked to freshwater delivery in order for this price to be complete. 
However, the price of recreational water use that we developed is comparable to 
previously available estimate (Frederick et al., 1997). 
Our study shows that the total valuation of recreational ecosystem services is 
sensitive to various ecological, economic, and management factors. The total value of 
lost recreation benefits is influenced by climatic factors such as rainfall, 
evapotranspiration, and other hydrological factors. The estimated hydrological equations 
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show statistically significant relationships between these factors and fish productivity. 
Therefore, future changes in climate could have a significant impact on the valuation of 
fishery ecosystem services. Biological factors that might affect fish abundance, catch and 
size of keepers could all significantly affect anglers’ preferences, and in turn, the total 
valuation. Similarly, the future Florida population and anglers’ confidence about the 
economy will have a direct bearing on the future valuation of recreational services. 
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Tables 
Table 2.1. Attribute Levels in Choice Experiment Design 
Variable Levels 
Catch rate  40% lower than the current level1 
 20% lower than the current level1 
 10% lower than the current level1,2 
 Same as the current level1,2 
 10% higher than the current level2 
 20% higher than the current level2 
 40% higher than the current level2 
Size of the largest keeper  20% smaller1 
 10% smaller1,2 
 Same size as the current largest keeper1,2 
 10% larger2 
 20% larger2 
Boat travel distance for 
fishing 
 40% increase in the distance1  
 20% increase in the distance1 
 10% increase in the distance1,2 
 Same as the current distance1,2 
 20% decrease in the distance2 
 40% decrease in the distance2 
Overall ecosystem health  40% worse1 
 20% worse1 
 Same as the current health1,2 
 20% better2 
 40% better2 
Cost  $0 cost per trip1 
 $10 cost per trip1,2 
 $20 cost per trip2 
 $30 cost per trip2 
 $40 cost per trip2 
 $50 cost per trip2 
1Scenario 1, 2Scenarios 2 and 3 
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Table 2.2. Baseline and target level total regulated freshwater delivery at ENP node (S12 and S333 structures), estimated 
average depth, and catch per unit effort of model recreational species1   
 Season 
SRS Inflows at 
S12+S333 (KAF) 
Estimated Average  
Water Depth (ft) 
Average Catch Per Unit Effort (Per Hour) 
Snook Redfish Tarpon Snapper Seatrout 
  Current Target 
Deficit 
from 
Target 
(%) 
At 
Current 
Flow 
At 
Target 
Flow 
Deficit 
from 
Target 
(%) Current 
Deficit 
from 
Target 
(%) Current 
Deficit 
from 
Target 
(%) Current 
Deficit 
from 
Target 
(%) Current 
Deficit 
from 
Target 
(%) Current 
Deficit 
from 
Target 
(%) 
Dec-Feb 258.4 593.3 56.4 0.98 2.55 61.7 0.25 44.4 0.24 38.9 0.16 37.4 0.63 34.3 0.58 30.3 
Mar-May 141.9 447.9 68.3 0.26 1.94 86.5 0.24 38.2 0.17 40.2 0.19 28.4 0.55 31.2 0.57 25.2 
Jun-Aug 251.2 655.7 61.7 0.77 2.80 72.4 0.23 35.7 0.20 32.8 0.22 22.6 0.62 25.6 0.61 21.1 
Sep-Nov 481.7 893.2 46.1 1.22 3.20 61.9 0.16 48.1 0.12 48.1 0.08 48.1 0.25 48.1 0.20 48.1 
Baseline levels are based on estimated average historical values. 
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Table 2.3. Estimated models of catch-flow and depth-flow relationships 
Model Variable Coefficient Std Error Adj R2 N Durbin-Watson  
Snook catch [equation (1)]   0.40 179 1.8298 
 SRS West Outflow 0.00290* 0.00038    
 Winter 0.14883* 0.02875    
 Spring 0.19960* 0.03094    
 Summer 0.15909* 0.02871    
Red Drum catch [equation (1)]   0.49 179 1.8652 
 SRS West Outflow 0.00222* 0.00027    
 Winter 0.16244* 0.02041    
 Spring 0.13772* 0.02193    
 Summer 0.14623* 0.02038    
Tarpon catch [equation (1)]   0.44 179 1.9654 
 SRS West Outflow 0.00142* 0.00031    
 Winter 0.11465* 0.02919    
 Spring 0.16529* 0.02787    
 Summer 0.18110* 0.02854    
Gray Snapper catch [equation (1)]   0.58 179 1.9768 
 SRS West Outflow 0.00476* 0.00067    
 Winter 0.46159* 0.05544    
 Spring 0.47467* 0.05677    
 Summer 0.49576* 0.05513    
Spotted Seatrout catch [equation (1)]   0.68 179 1.9271 
 SRS West Outflow 0.00367* 0.00052    
 Winter 0.45322* 0.04401    
 Spring 0.51085* 0.04456    
 Summer 0.51841* 0.04368    
SRS Outflow [equation (2)]   0.79 489 1.8992 
 SRS North Inflow (m-1) 0.36999* 0.01525    
 Rainfall (m-1) 0.11899* 0.01211    
 
Evaporation + Percolation + 
South Outflow (m-1) 
-0.10740* 0.01832    
Water Depth [equation (4)]   0.79 59 1.8224 
 Intercept 0.65464** 0.12955    
 SRS North Inflow 0.00436* 0.00057    
 Rainfall 0.00142* 0.00036    
 All Losses  -0.00292* 0.00076    
Annual Fishing Trips [equation (17)]   0.49 27 1.5604 
 Intercept 8594.26 3040.01    
 
Registered recreational 
vessels 
0.09624* 0.03503    
 US consumer confidence 193.24* 63.34    
 2015 estimated # annual trips 44,627     
* p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.10 
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Table 2.4. Mixed logit models of discrete choice experiment and willingness to pay 
for ENP fishery recreational attributes 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
Catcha  0.008138*   0.002580      
Ecosystem Healtha  0.021800** 0.002896      
Keeper Sizeb  0.010381** 0.004273      
Travel Distanceb -0.009992* 0.002653     
Costb -0.006344** 0.003184     
   
Chi-square 17.49  
n 3468  
 
Attribute Willingness to Pay Std. Error 
Catch   1.28** 0.67437 
Ecosystem Health   3.44** 1.68306 
Keeper Size   1.64*** 0.93548 
Travel Distance -1.58*** 0.85609 
 
aFixed, bRandom;  *p < 0.01; ** p<0.05, ***p<0.10 
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Table 2.5. Monthly penalty or lost values recreational ecosystem services due to unmet target delivery at S12 and S333 
structures along the SRS northern boundary 
Freshwater 
Flow 
(KAF) Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 (Million $) 
0 2.15 1.51 7.45 6.83 3.26 0.74 1.26 1.87 1.44 1.58 1.81 2.98 
50 1.58 0.93 5.50 4.86 1.38 0.47 1.01 1.51 1.14 1.31 1.55 2.45 
100 1.02 0.35 3.54 2.89 0 0.20 0.76 1.16 0.84 1.05 1.29 1.91 
150 0.46 0 1.59 0.91 0 0 0.51 0.81 0.55 0.78 1.03 1.38 
200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.26 0.45 0.25 0.51 0.77 0.84 
250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.10 0 0.25 0.52 0.30 
300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.26 0 
350 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Marginal 
value 
($/AF) 
 
28.46  
 
28.73   111.79  
 
112.11  
 
110.26   13.79   13.39   15.46  
 
12.63  12.03  
 
11.88  
 
27.91  
Mean marginal value (Min – Max) ($/AF) 41.54 (11.88 - 112.11) 
Mean marginal value for ecosystem health only (Min – Max) 
($/AF)  39.36 (10.05 - 109.05) 
Value of water in the US ($/AF) [Source: Frederick et al., (1997)]: In 1994 US $ In 2015 US $a 
  Recreation/habitat 48.00 76.77 
  Irrigation  75.00 119.95 
  Industrial 282.00 451.00 
  Domestic use 194.00 310.27 
  Thermal power 34.00 54.38 
  Hydropower 25.00 39.98 
aAssumed a cumulative inflation rate of 59.9% between 1994 and 2015. 
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Table 2.6. Effects of alternative water management on losses in recreational 
ecosystem service values   
Regulated Water Flow Scenarios 
Annual 
Delivery 
(KAF) 
Penalty 
(Million $) 
Gain in Recreational 
Value from the 
Baseline (%) 
Baseline 754 25.72 0.00 
Increase by 50% all months (scenario 1) 1132 22.13 13.96 
Increase by 50% dry months (scenario 2) 766 23.70 7.85 
Increase by 50% wet months (scenario 3) 1043 24.14 6.14 
Increase to historical flow (scenario 4) 1040 21.52 16.33 
Increase by 100% all months (scenario 5) 1509 18.55 27.88 
Target level delivery (scenario 6) 2590 0.00 100.00 
  
 
Percent of  
Baseline Total 
Baseline – ecosystem health only  754 21.57 93.96 
Baseline – recreational fishing only 754 4.15 6.04 
Baseline 754 25.72 100.00 
 
Figures 
Figure 2.1. Map of Everglades National Park: Shark River boundary, the location of 
S12 and S333 hydrological structures and the southwest outflow tributaries  
 
 (Source: https://sofia.usgs.gov/publications/papers/swdis_salmon/images/fig1x.gif) 
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Figure 2.2. Integrated framework for developing ecological-economic penalty 
function for managing freshwater flows in the Florida Everglades    
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Total economic recreational catch value in relation to flow 
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Figure 2.4. Three Year Average Current Flow and Target Flow at the ENP Node 
(S12+S333 Structures) 
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3. Valuing Ecosystem Services Under Climate Risk: A Case of Recreation in the 
Florida Everglades  
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
3.1.1 Effects of sea level rise on the Florida Everglades 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report outlines changes 
in the frequency, spatial distribution, and magnitude of several climatic conditions and 
extreme events that are likely to occur in the not too distant future and could pose 
significant risks to human well-being (IPCC, 2014). Among such changes is accelerated 
sea level rise (SLR), posing particular concern to coastal communities. South Florida is 
among the areas of North America most vulnerable to inundation (Dolan & Walker, 
2006; Erwin, 2009; Gornall et al., 2010; Scavia et al., 2002). In addition to inundation, 
rising sea level can cause shoreline erosion and inland migration, altered salinity and 
water quality regimes in coastal bays, and increased salinity of freshwater ecosystems 
and aquifers (Scavia et al., 2002).  
Increasing threat of SLR and other adverse environmental phenomena (pollution, 
etc.) inflict significant losses on society. In the context of SLR and Florida residents, 
Meng (2016) shows that people are willing to implement and support adaptation plans. 
However, the extent of their support to adaptation plans depends on, among other factors, 
their perception of SLR risks, where they live, and whether they are residents or not. 
Obviously, the more concerned people are about future climate, flood and pollution risks, 
the more eager they are to support and value an adaptation plan (Hunter et al., 2012; Lee 
& Cameron, 2008; Meng, 2016; Schaafsma, Brouwer, & Rose, 2012). Studies also show 
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that resource users attach significant non-market benefits to climate adaptation plan, for 
instance increasing freshwater flows in the Everglades in terms of recreational and 
commercial fisheries (Brown et al., 2018), groundwater improvements (C. J. Richardson, 
2010; L. Richardson et al., 2014), and carbon storage (Jerath et al., 2016).  
However, studies that explicitly link the users’ perception of climate change and 
other risks to their welfare value estimates are limited. A few notable exceptions that link 
environmental risk perception and welfare estimation include Viscusi and Zeckhauser 
(2006) and Lee and Cameron (2008) in the case of climate risk reduction. Using a choice 
experiment, Brouwer and Schaafsma (2012) showed that homeowners’ willingness to pay 
for flood insurance depends on where people live (along the coast or the river) and their 
perceptions about flood risks. Birol et al. (2009) also showed that local residents in their 
study were found to be willing to accept an increase in local taxation to reduce flood 
risks. Remoundou et al. (2015) found that in Northern Spain, people concerned about 
SLR and ocean temperature were willing to pay higher values to protect biodiversity and 
recreation opportunities. 
On the contrary, a recent study in Science by Stern et al. (2016) notes the presence 
of a certain degree of neoskepticism about climate risks, generally accepting the 
existence of anthropogenic climate change but "advocat[ing] against urgent mitigation 
efforts," which can be a major challenge for resource managers to gain public support for 
mitigation (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010). Neoskeptics who defend business as usual may not 
necessarily disbelieve in climate change, but may want to see more scientific evidence 
than what is available, think it is not happening during their lifetimes, or defer 
responsibility to the government or the future. Understandably, neoskeptics may not 
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readily support public or private actions for mitigation and see such as an economic 
burden. 
The purpose of the current paper is to first develop estimates of various 
psychometric risk measures that characterize people’s risk perception (RP), risk concern 
(RC), and risk-reduction action (RR), and then to test how their risk perception affects 
their willingness to pay for risk reduction. The case in point is recreational fisheries in the 
Florida Everglades and the non-market benefit that anglers derive from increasing 
freshwater flow as a measure to mitigate the effects of SLR on the coastal ecosystem. The 
study also aims to assess if there is an element of risk skepticism present among the 
recreational resource users of the study ecosystem. The present study follows Hunter et 
al. (2012) in modeling psychometric measures of RP, RC and RR and then incorporates 
those measures into conventional utility-theoretic model of non-market valuation. The 
study makes two noteworthy contributions to the climate-related risk valuation literature 
and its management. First, current research on the effects of climate risk perception on 
adaptation and valuation is rather limited particularly in the context of SLR and coastal 
resource protection. The study sheds light on how different psychological phases of risk 
evolution—RP, RC, and RA—influences the environmental value construct (willingness 
to pay). Second, although certain stakeholders may be apathetic to climate risks, the 
impacts those risks will have on society are real. Understanding the demographic and 
other differences in people’s risk perception and valuation could aid resource 
management agencies in targeting stakeholders and designing programs that would 
improve climate risk literacy and awareness, and in turn, their support for climate risk 
mitigation (Vignola, Klinsky, Tam, & McDaniels, 2013).  
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3.1.2 Estimating the benefits of improved recreational fisheries 
Lancaster’s theory of value provides the conceptual microeconomic framework 
for choice modeling (Hanley, Mourato, & Wright, 2001; Hoyos, 2010), which centers 
upon the assumption that an agent’s utility or net benefit received from a good can be 
decomposed into utilities for the good’s composing characteristics (Lancaster, 1966). 
That is, an individual received utility not from the good itself, but from the characteristics 
or attributes of said good.  
The discrete choice experiment (DCE) methodology elicits individual’s 
preferences through constructing a hypothetical market scenario using a questionnaire. 
Respondents are presented several choice sets consisting of mutually exclusive 
alternative descriptions of a good from which they select their most preferred alternative 
(Hanley et al., 2001). Consumer decisions can be separated into a discrete choice, i.e., 
which good to consume, and a continuous choice, i.e., how much of that good to 
consume. Discrete choice experiments are constructed to isolate the discrete choice, 
making the methodology ideal for valuation of non-market goods such as ecosystem 
services in that the quantity of these goods are fixed for all agents (Hanemann, 1984). By 
their very nature DCEs force individuals to weigh the trade-offs of present costs or 
benefits, which are known with certainty, against risky future outcomes (de Palma et al., 
2008). When the price of a good is included as an attribute, willingness to pay (WTP) for 
changes in attribute levels can be recovered (Hoyos, 2010).  
The authors adapted a discrete choice model (Vojáček & Pecáková, 2010) 
complying with utility maximization and random utility theory (de Palma et al., 2008; 
Lancaster, 1966) to estimate resource users’ WTP for improved recreational fishery 
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ecosystem services. Following a standard random utility specification, a resource user is 
asked to select one of three hypothetical scenarios, two of which are restoration options at 
a higher cost than the low or no cost status-quo option. Outcomes of each scenario are 
characterized by a vector of variables (Q), and the utility a resource user derives from 
option r can then be represented as 
𝑈𝑟(𝑄, 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) = 𝑉𝑟(𝑄, 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀𝑟     (1) 
where I is the resource user’s disposable income, A is the unavoidable cost the resource 
user would be willing to pay for the improved environmental quality, and S is a vector of 
demographic variables. The observable, or empirically measurable, component of utility 
is represented by 𝑉𝑟(∙), while the unobservable stochastic component is represented by 𝜀𝑟 
and modeled as econometric error. A resource user is assumed to choose the scenario 
from which they derive the greatest utility (de Palma et al., 2008). That is, they would be 
willing to pay an amount A if, 
𝑉1(𝑄1, 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀1 ≥ 𝑉0(𝑄0, 𝐼 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀0    (2) 
While socioeconomic factors including income and education are determinants of an 
individual’s WTP, it is also influenced by their perceptions of and preferences for risk 
(Bartczak, Mariel, Chilton, & Meyerhoff, 2013; O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1999). 
Following Johnston et. al (2013), alternative-specific constants indicating improved 
environmental quality scenarios are used in model estimation. 
Additionally, a resource user’s knowledge of the resource, both endogenous and 
exogenous, also has a bearing on their WTP, thus any respondents who had not fished in 
the Everglades within the previous three years were screened out of the survey, 
guaranteeing at least a minimum level of experience and endogenous familiarity with the 
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resource. To ensure respondents were making informed choices, additional information 
about the Everglades area was presented in the survey (Bergstrom, 1990; Cameron & 
Englin, 1997; Freeman, 2003), including maps, graphic illustrations, text descriptions, 
and videos.  
Simulated-likelihood mixed logit was used to estimate the parameters of the 
random utility discrete choice model. Using these estimated model parameters, the 
authors calculated the mean WTP of ENP anglers for percent improvements in fish catch 
(𝑤𝑐) and overall ecosystem health (𝑤𝑒), expressed as the ratios of the attribute 
coefficients to the cost coefficient (Hole, 2006; Johnston et al., 2013).  
3.1.3 The effect of risk perception on WTP 
Individuals may value ES for a range of reasons. Pure non-use value, or existence 
value, is an individual’s WTP for simply knowing that a resource exists even if no use is 
indented. Utilitarian, or use value, is the usage of an ecosystem for amenities or products 
that derive both present and future benefits. For example, consumptive products such as 
timber and amenities such as recreation are considered use values (Costanza, Farber, & 
Maxwell, 1989). Where existence and use values have more than a modicum of certainty 
attached, option value is a function of uncertainty (Pearce & Turner, 1990). Because 
individuals are uncertain about future demand, one may be willing to pay now for the 
option of using a resource in the future (Hein, van Koppen, de Groot, & van Ierland, 
2006). The option value is a premium that an individual will pay above the expected use 
value, resulting from uncertainty about either an individual’s preferences or the price or 
availability of the resource in the future, and is conditional upon the individual being at 
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least to some degree risk averse (Costanza et al., 1989; Hein et al., 2006; Pearce & 
Turner, 1990). 
Individual risk perceptions may be influenced by the context in which individuals 
make a decision (James & Meek, 1976; Slovic, 1987). Context can correspond to past 
experience, anticipatory feelings regarding some future state, or even to the way in which 
decision outcomes are presented (Cohen, Etner, & Jeleva, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986). Stone and Gronhaug (1993) classified the components of perceived risk as: 
financial, psychological, social, performance, physical, and time-related. Berk and 
Fovell’s (1999) study on public perceptions of climate change presented a sample of Los 
Angeles residents with sets of empirically possible and historically plausible hypothetical 
climate scenarios to estimate their WTP to prevent significant climate change. Among the 
findings were that respondents were more concerned with use value than existence value, 
and that it would take very large climate changes from a scientific perspective to generate 
even modest changes in WTP. Respondents’ perceptions of climate change were found to 
be relative, as evidenced by valuation of future climate change being a function of the 
respondent’s current climate. Ultimately, they found that within the range of climate 
scenarios considered, individuals would be willing to incur at least some costs to prevent 
change (Berk & Fovell, 1999).  
An understanding of public perceptions of climate change risk is critical in order 
to avoid social barriers and garner public support for mitigation and adaptation policy 
implementation (Vignola et al., 2013). In the context of health risk, Mitchell (1998) finds 
that beyond a certain threshold or tolerance level of perceived risk, individuals will 
employ risk-reduction strategies to lower the perceived risk to or below the tolerance 
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level. The argument that a higher perceived risk leads to a higher motivation to adapt to 
climate change is also supported by Osberghaus et al.’s (2010) study on information and 
risk perception, which builds on the socio-psychological model of Protection Motivation 
Theory. The approach the authors chose in the present study to examine perceived risk is 
the psychometric paradigm, wherein individuals make quantitative decisions regarding 
the current and desired risk levels of certain hazards, their desired level of regulation of 
each (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1984), and express their willingness to pay for risk reduction 
(Hunter et al., 2012; Sukharomana and Supalla, 1998; Georgiou et al., 1998). Following 
Fischhoff et al. (1978) and others, the authors assume that those who perceive climate-
related risks to be real and high, become more concerned about its adverse impacts on 
their future availability of certain ecosystem services that they enjoy currently. 
Concerned users will further show higher willingness to take certain actions to mitigate 
the risks. Such actions may be to push for more regulation and public investments for risk 
mitigation and willingness to make their own contributions for ecosystem improvements, 
expressed as increased welfare values (see Figure 3.1). 
3.2. Study area 
The largest subtropical wetland ecosystem in North America, ENP comprises 
approximately 1.5 million acres on the southern tip of the Florida peninsula, including 
Florida Bay. Containing both subtropical upland and marine ecosystems, freshwater 
slough and seasonally flooded marl prairie, tropical hardwood hammock forest, pine 
rockland, and mangrove and estuarine habitats (Gunderson, 1994; C. J. Richardson, 2010; 
Saha et al., 2012), ENP’s aquatic communities support a variety of seagrasses, freshwater 
59 
 
benthic plants, and aquatic organisms. Not only does the Everglades provide vital 
breeding and foraging habitat for over 400 species of birds, functioning as an important 
migratory corridor, it is also critical for water storage and recharge of the Biscayne 
aquifer, the principal source of freshwater for south Florida (Lorenz, 2014; Saha et al., 
2012).  
Everglades National Park and its surrounding bays, including Whitewater Bay, 
Tarpon Bay, and Florida Bay, generate more than $1.2 billion in annual economic 
activity from its world-class recreational fisheries (Fedler, 2009). Recent annual fishing 
reports estimate that over 90% of boaters in ENP participate in recreational fishing, with 
boaters launching primarily from Flamingo and Chokoloskee (Ault et al., 2008). Brown 
et. al. (2018) estimated the number of unique fishing trips in ENP at 44,627 in 2015, a 
16% increase over the preceding ten-year period. This estimate is a function of the 
number of registered vessels and consumer confidence, both of which have been 
increasing in recent years. Based on aerial surveys, the seasonal distribution of fishing 
trips peaks in winter (33.04%) and spring (36.2%), falling in summer (13.29%) and fall 
(17.47%) (Ault et al., 2008). 
3.3. Survey design 
3.3.1 Survey instrument 
Data for this study were gathered from responses to an online questionnaire 
administered in November and December 2015. The questionnaire was developed and 
tested over one year in a collaborative process, including the participation of ecologists, 
hydrologists, economists, and stakeholders, ensuring that relevant attributes were 
considered (Johnston, Schultz, Segerson, Besedin, & Ramachandran, 2012; Schultz, 
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Johnston, Segerson, & Besedin, 2012). Screener questions were employed to ensure 
respondents were at either full- or part-time residents of the state of Florida and had 
visited ENP for recreational fishing at least once in the previous three years. A total of 
3,354 questionnaires were attempted, of which 2,949 (87.92%) were completed. Of those, 
600 (20.34%) were usable, with the remainder discarded because of nonresponse to 
specific questions (e.g., choice experiment).  
The questionnaire was structured into three sections. The first section explained 
the motivation and purpose of the survey, along with an assessment of respondents’ 
knowledge and use of the Florida Everglades, including questions about how often they 
fish in the Everglades, where they fish, and what species they target. The second section 
provides a non-technical explanation of climate change, SLR, and the possible effects of 
both on the Everglades ecosystems and the fish populations. This explanation sets the 
context for the discrete choice experiment, also in the second section, with respondents 
each receiving two randomized choice cards. The third section explores respondents’ 
perceptions of and concern about climate change and SLR, both in general and regarding 
the Everglades in particular, along with their attitudes toward control or regulation of 
these risks. These eleven items, following the psychometric paradigm (Slovic, 1987), 
were rated on a five-point Likert scale. The first set of three questions evaluated 
respondents’ perception of the risk of SLR [Risk Perception (RP) variables]. The second 
and third sets of four questions each evaluated respondents’ concern [Risk Concern (RC) 
variables] about specific risks and attitudes toward control or regulation [Risk Reduction 
or Regulation (RR) variables], respectively. The data were tested for internal consistency 
of the questions in each group. Cronbach alpha values for RP, RC, RR groups and all 
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questions combined were 0.4, 0.9, 0.6 and 0.8, respectively. The authors recognize that 
the RP questions may have failed the internal consistency test with alpha = 0.4 < 0.6. 
However, other groups are found to be consistent and it is not believed the above issue 
has affected the Factor Analysis results to be discussed later. The final section also 
included a series of demographic questions (e.g., age, education, gender, income). 
3.3.2 Valuation scenarios 
Following the theoretical model, the structure of the discrete choice experiment 
had respondents choose from three scenarios for restoration of freshwater flow. See 
Brown et al. (2018) for detailed description of the scenario designs used in the 
experiment. The survey presented respondents with two sequential randomized choice 
experiments, each consisting of one choice card in which they were asked to select their 
preferred of three scenarios in terms of percent change from the current level in five 
attributes of the recreational fishing experience. Three of these attributes were fishery-
specific (catch rate, size of the largest keeper, and travel distance for fishing) and one 
attribute represented the overall ecological effect of restoration in order to provide a 
comprehensive array of direct and indirect indicators of management outcomes (Johnston 
et al., 2012). The final attribute was price, characterizing the individual per-trip cost. All 
choice cards included a “status-quo” Scenario I, representing no changes to water 
management at low or no additional cost, with Scenarios II and III representing 
conditions at least as good or better than the current level at a higher cost (Brown et al., 
2018). 
Attribute levels were assigned after expert consultation to determine feasible 
outcomes. Each attribute is represented as a percent change relative to current conditions. 
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Attribute levels for catch rate were: no change, 10%, 20%, and 40% higher and lower. 
Levels for size of the largest keeper were: no change, 10%, and 20% bigger or smaller. 
Levels for boat travel distance for fishing were: no change, 10%, 20%, and 40% decrease 
or increase. Levels for overall ecosystem health were: no change, 20%, and 40% better or 
worse. The additional per-trip cost ranged from $0 to $50 in increments of $10. To 
minimize correlation for a choice model covariance matrix, a fractional factorial design 
was used, resulting in 180 unique choice profiles blocked into 60 choice cards. The 
survey was conducted online using the Qualtrics platform, and 600 completed surveys are 
analyzed in this study.  
3.3.3 Econometric model specification 
Following previous studies (Berk & Fovell, 1999; Hanley et al., 2001; Hoyos, 
2010; Hunter et al., 2012; Johnston et al., 2012; Vojáček & Pecáková, 2010), in the 
analysis of the responses the random utility models were estimated using simulated-
likelihood mixed logit with Halton draws in preference-space, allowing us to consider the 
coefficients as independent and randomly distributed for all the attributes except Cost. 
Following the random utility model described in equation (2), a respondent’s probability 
of saying yes to paying amount A is 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐴) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑉1(𝑄1, 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀1 ≥ 𝑉0(𝑄0, 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) + 𝜀0]  
 (3) 
    = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑉1(𝑄1, 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) − 𝑉0(𝑄0, 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) ≥ 𝜀0 − 𝜀1] 
 (4) 
    = 𝐹𝑛(𝑛)       
 (5) 
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    = 𝐹𝑛(∆𝑉)       
 (6) 
Where 𝑛 = 𝜀0 − 𝜀1 and ∆𝑉 = 𝑉1(𝑄1, 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆) − 𝑉0(𝑄0, 𝑌 − 𝐴, 𝑆), ∆𝑉 is the 
difference in utility, and 𝐹𝑛(∆𝑉) is the cumulative probability density function. Per the 
logit model,  
𝐹𝑛(∆𝑉) =
1
1+𝑒−∆𝑉
        (7) 
𝐹𝑛(∆𝑉(𝐴)) =
1
1+𝑒−∆𝑉(𝐴)
       (8) 
The observable component of utility 𝑉𝑟 for each individual i is specified to be 
linear in parameters, such that  
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑋𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖       (9) 
where 𝑋𝑟𝑘 is a vector of K choice-related characteristics consisting of individual 
characteristics and observed attributes, and 𝛽𝑟𝑘 is a vector of K parameters to be 
estimated. 
In the present study, respondents make a choice among three alternatives: one 
status quo, and two with some level of restored freshwater flow and improved services 
compared to the status quo. The restoration can be realized at a cost to be paid in 
increased boat launch fee per fishing trip, and the cost of no restoration is negligible or 
zero. Using this, equation (9) can be generally formulated as, 
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓𝐹𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖     (10) 
where 𝛼 is the alternative specific constant (ASC), 𝛽𝑓 is the vector of coefficients to 
recreational fishery choice attributes F, 𝛽𝑐 is the coefficient to cost attribute C, and 𝛽𝑠 is 
the vector of coefficients to sociodemographic factors and risk attitudinal attributes S. 
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Five specifications of this model were estimated to explore the effects of individuals’ risk 
perceptions on WTP in a step-wise fashion. Model 1 is specified as an “attribute-only” 
model to set a baseline for testing interaction effects, 
 𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓𝐹𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖      (11) 
Models 2 and 3 then interact the ASC with a vector of risk attitudes and 
sociodemographic factors, respectively, 
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓𝐹𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑖𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑟𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑑𝐴𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖
 (12) 
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓𝐹𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑟𝑖𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑒𝑑𝑢𝐴𝑟𝑖𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑐𝐴𝑟𝑖𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖
 (13) 
where A is ASC, 𝛽𝐴𝑝𝑒𝑟 is the vector of coefficients to the interaction of ASC and Risk 
Perception attributes, 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛 is the vector of coefficients to the interaction of ASC and 
Risk Concern attributes, 𝛽𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑑 is the vector of coefficients to the interaction of ASC and 
Risk Reduction attributes, 𝛽𝐴𝑎𝑔𝑒 is the coefficient to the interaction of ASC and Age, 
𝛽𝐴𝑒𝑑𝑢 is the coefficient to the interaction of ASC and Education, and 𝛽𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑐 is the 
coefficient to the interaction of ASC and Income. 
 Models 4 and 5 interact individual Risk Perception factors with fishery attributes 
to test the influence of these factors on WTP versus an attribute-only model described in 
equation (11). 
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑃𝑖𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑅𝑃𝑖𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑃𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑅𝑃𝑖𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖       
 (14) 
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𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓𝐹𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑅𝑃𝑖𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑅𝑃𝑖𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑃𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑅𝑃𝑖𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖       
 (15) 
where 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ is the coefficient to the interaction of Risk Perception and the Catch 
attribute, 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 is the coefficient to the interaction of Risk Perception and the Size of 
the Largest Keeper attribute, 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the coefficient to the interaction of Risk 
Perception and the Travel Distance for Fishing attribute, and 𝛽𝑅𝑃𝑒𝑐𝑜 is the coefficient to 
the interaction of Risk Perception and the Overall Ecosystem Health attribute. Each of the 
above models was estimated using mixed logit procedure in STATA software.  
3.4. Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Sample demographics are shown in Table 3.1. The average age of respondents 
was 38.31 with a median of 35, somewhat lower than Florida’s population median age of 
41.8. Median household income was very similar to the wider population. Respondents’ 
distribution of race and ethnicity was also very similar to the Florida population, although 
those identifying as Hispanic were slightly underrepresented in the sample. 
Most respondents launched their recreational fishing vessels from either 
Everglades City (45.02%) or Flamingo (41.24%), with the remainder launching from the 
Florida Keys (13.75%). The majority of respondents reported fishing in both Everglades 
backcountry and bay waters (65.88%), with 19.83% restricting their fishing to the bays 
(brackish or saltwater), and 14.29% to the backcountry (primarily freshwater). The top 
three fish species targeted by anglers (indicating they frequently or always target them) 
were Gray Snapper (Lutjanus griseus), Red Drum (Sciaenops ocellatus), and Snook 
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(Centropomus undecimalis). 56% of respondents considered “being able to see other 
wildlife” very or extremely important. Sixty percent reported being “very much 
concerned” regarding the Everglades overall ecosystem health. 
3.4.2 Respondents’ risk perception, concern, and reduction 
Results of the array of psychometric questions are presented in Table 3.2a. 
Respondents indicated they were most concerned about the overall ecosystem health and 
future fish abundance in the Everglades, with mean scores of 4.38 and 4.23, respectively. 
Results indicate that while respondents believe that the predicted SLR will happen in 
their lifetime and they have a moderately high level of concern about SLR in the 
Everglades, they do not believe that the relevant public agencies will manage freshwater 
flow effectively without their contribution to the effort. Overall, results suggest high 
support for regulatory action (average score of 4.12) as well as a strong sense of personal 
responsibility for contributing toward actions to minimize impacts of SLR (4.07). 
It is interesting to note that survey respondents scored an average value of 2.77 or 
lower on all the questions that conveyed a sense of skepticism toward SLR-related risks, 
i.e., “I can live with the negative impacts of SLR (statement #2; mean = 2.35), “it is too 
early to worry about SLR…” (statement 3; mean = 2.32), and “the relevant public 
agencies will manage the freshwater flow (statement #10, mean = 2.77). These results 
indicated that, on average, sample respondents disagreed with the above statements, 
signifying a lower level of skepticism about climate risk. That is, they feel they would not 
want to live the negative impacts of SLR, that it is time to worry about SLR, and that they 
do not want to simply shun mitigation responsibilities to relevant public agencies. 
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Table 3.2b presents the differences in anglers’ risk attitude and perception across 
different demographic groups. Earlier studies of general Florida population about climate 
risks and ecosystem restoration (Sikder, 2016) indicate that there could be significant 
variation among residents of Florida living at different distances from the coast. That 
study also found some minor differences across people of different demographic groups. 
The results of this study show that anglers fishing in the Everglades have uniform risk 
perception and risk mitigation attitudes across wide demographic groups. The only 
exceptions were as a function of gender and income regarding RC questions, and across 
marital status, education, and income with respect to RP questions.  
Further, responses to psychometric questions were subjected to principal 
component factor analysis. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin values indicated that all variables were 
suitable for inclusion, and a varimax (orthogonal) rotation was performed. Two 
meaningful factors with eigenvalues > 1 were extracted and loading on a given factor was 
assumed if loading > 0.5. Each factor represents a certain underlying (latent) attitude 
towards climate risks. The statements or variables associated with these factors were 
labeled “Positive Risk Perception (PRP)” and “Risk Skepticism (RSK) about risk posed 
by SLR” (Stern et al., 2016) for factors 1 and 2, respectively. Measured (observed) risk 
variables used in the factor analysis and their corresponding loadings are presented in 
Table 3.3. These extracted factors closely matched the three sets of psychometric 
questions presented to respondents in the survey. That is, Factor 1 carried those risk 
questions that were worded as having concern for the changing environment (e.g., 
concerns about SLR and its impacts on the Everglades, fish abundance and freshwater), 
and showed a positive willingness to act for addressing those changes (e.g., both personal 
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support and desire for public support of restoration). On the contrary, all three measured 
variables that were loaded into Factor 2 reflected a certain degree of skepticism in that 
respondents did not believe the said environmental changes would be real, could live with 
the negative impacts, and/or did trust the government would take care of the problem. 
Although the survey was set up with three sets of risk questions (RP, RC and RR), they 
were loaded into only two factors, representing the two underlying latent variables, 
Positive Risk Perception and Risk Skepticism. All the four RC variables, one RP variable 
(i.e., the perception that SLR will happen during one’s life) and two RR variables (i.e., 
that “government must take action” and that “I am also responsible to take action”) had 
large, positive loadings (>0.5206) on positive risk perception factor (PRP). That is, PRP 
factor describes variations in those seven variables (Table 3.3) adequately. Similarly, 
three negatively meaning RSK variables (“I can live with negative impacts…”, “it is too 
early to worry…”, and “government will take action…”) had large, positive loadings 
(>0.6972). So, the RSK factor described variation in the three measured statements that 
signify lack of belief in climate risk, apathy and shunning of responsibility to the 
government. 
To support the paradigm described in Figure 3.1, the coefficients of correlation 
between the pairs of the three sets of psychometric questions were estimated. That is, the 
average of scores of all the variables within each of the risk categories were computed 
first, i.e., RP, RC and RR corresponding to each of the first three boxes in Figure 3.1, 
respectively. The average scores are described in Table 3.2a and the results of the factor 
analysis in Table 3.3.  
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The authors then estimated the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between RP and 
RC, and the correlation between RC and RR. Both these correlation coefficients (0.463 
and 0.631, respectively) were positive and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. These 
correlation coefficients support the authors’ hypothesis that the respondents who possess 
strong (high) perception about SLR and the possible impacts on the ecosystem will be 
concerned about the said risk and as a result, might provide strong support for appropriate 
mitigation action and express high willingness to pay for such action. Furthermore, 
authors found positive and statistically significant correlation between RP and RR 
variables. That is, people who perceive climate risk to be real and happening in their 
lifetime were more likely to support risk reduction policies. 
3.4.3 Respondents’ WTP and the influence of risk perception 
Five different random utility choice models were estimated, the results of which 
are presented in Table 3.4, with descriptions of variables presented in Table 3.5. Because 
discrete choice models require alternative-specific variables, case-specific variables are 
interacted. Model 1 simply examined the effects of attributes on the choice outcome for 
all respondents. Model 2 is an extended model in order to test whether respondents were 
likely to respond differently to three climate risk perception, concern and reduction 
variables under business as usual scenario vs. the  two improve scenarios. Model 3 is an 
extended model accounting for socio-demographic heterogeneity. Model 4 is an 
interaction model to compare the interaction risk terms against Model 1. Model 5 is an 
extension of Model 4, examining the interaction terms as well as the original attributes.  
In the basic attribute only model, ASC was positive and significant, indicating 
that respondents had some preference toward choosing an improve scenario (moving 
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away from status quo). The coefficients for the choice attributes of Catch and EcoHealth 
were significant with expected signs, and Cost had a negative sign as expected, implying 
that a scenario is less likely to be chosen if the cost is higher (Brown et al., 2018). The 
Keeper and Distance attributes were found to be insignificant. In the basic model, the risk 
perception variable is implicit and subsumed in ASC. In the model that introduces socio-
demographic variables interacted with ASC, Catch, EcoHealth, and Cost are significant 
with expected signs, while the only significant socio-demographic variable is Education, 
with a positive coefficient. 
Models that introduce risk perception, concern, and reduction (terms interacted 
with attributes) had a positive and significant ASC, again indicating that respondents had 
some preferences toward choosing improve scenarios. As hypothesized the coefficient of 
the cost variable was negative and statistically significant across all the five models. The 
catch and overall ecosystem health variable coefficients were also positive and significant 
in all but one model as expected. Overall, Chi-Square values of all the estimated models 
suggested that they fit the data well. 
Willingness to pay (WTP) of respondents can be computed using the following 
formula: 
𝑊𝑇𝑃 = −
?̂?𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒
?̂?𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
        (16) 
Where ?̂?𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒 is the model-estimated coefficient for the attribute parameter in 
question, and ?̂?𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the model-estimated coefficient of the cost parameter. 
Table 3.6 presents the estimates of WTP of respondents for two ecosystem 
services (fish catch and overall ecosystem health) under different levels of risk 
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perception. For comparison, estimated coefficients of attribute-only model (model 1) and 
coefficients of model with risk-perception (model 5) were used to compute WTP 
estimates. Individual-specific perceptions of the risks posed by SLR were positively 
related to WTP, indicating that those who viewed it as a higher risk were willing to pay 
more. For every one percent improvement in fish catch due to increased freshwater flow 
(a climate mitigation strategy), WTP ranged from $0.25 at the risk perception level of 3 
(measured on Likert scale) to $1.00 at the risk perception level of 5. Similarly, the WTP 
value for a percent improvement in the overall ecosystem health increased from $0.32 at 
the risk perception score of 3 to $2.07 at the risk perception of 5. Authors ignored the 
model-estimated WTP values for risk perception at Likert scale of 1 and 2 as they were 
negative. Finally, RP-adjusted weighted WTP was calculated using the sample average 
percent of respondents that expressed different levels of agreement to risk attitude 
questions as weights. On average, 4.29% strongly disagreed (Likert scale = 1), 7.51% 
somewhat disagreed (2), 19.27% neutral (3), 31.88% agreed (4), and 37.04% strongly 
agreed (5) to the eleven risk questions. The risk-adjusted WTP values for percent 
improvement in catch and ecosystem health were $0.62 and $1.21, respectively.  
3.5. Discussion and Management Implications 
3.5.1 Nonmarket benefits of increasing managed freshwater inflows 
Historically, water flowed south from Lake Okeechobee through the Everglades 
in a broad, slow-moving shallow river. Since development of a comprehensive freshwater 
drainage system in South Florida beginning in the early 1900s, these flows have been 
constrained by a dike and levee system and by urban and agricultural water demands, 
occupying less than half of their original areal extent and relegating the Everglades to 
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part of a complex watershed management system (Ogden et al., 2005; Sklar et al., 2001, 
2005). Because the Everglades watershed is managed primarily for agriculture, flood 
control, and consumptive uses (Sklar et al., 2005), the flow of freshwater through the 
Everglades has been reduced, channelized, and otherwise modified, resulting in dramatic 
changes to biota, salinity regimes, and a variety of ecosystem services in the coastal 
Everglades (Perry, 2008; Rand & Bachman, 2008).  
Large, subtropical bays and estuaries within ENP provide critical habitat for a 
variety of species, including seagrasses and coastal mangrove communities (Bachman & 
Rand, 2008). They serve as nurseries for larvae and juveniles of many critical species, 
including highly sought-after sport fish and wading birds (Lorenz, 2014). Freshwater 
flows are a key determinant of habitat and fisheries resource productivity (Rudnick, 
Ortner, Browder, & Davis, 2005; Stabenau, Engel, Sadle, & Pearlstine, 2011; Walters, 
Gunderson, & Holling, 1992), making the recreational fishing industry in the area a direct 
beneficiary of improved and sustained fishery habitat (e.g., Boucek & Rehage, 2013). 
3.5.2 The importance of risk perception 
Overall, the study results provide evidence for the fact that the anglers perceive a 
high level of climate-related to risks and their impact on the Everglades ecosystem 
services. More than 68% of the respondents believe risk is real, support mitigation 
actions and express a high degree of willingness to pay for mitigation. As with other 
studies, the individual-specific perceptions and attitudes varied across the sample 
respondents, reflecting underlying heterogeneity in interpreting and understanding the 
risks posed by climate change and SLR (Hunter et al., 2012). This heterogeneity was 
most pronounced in RP across gender and income, and in RC across marital status, and 
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income. Interestingly, there was no difference across sample respondents as far as RR 
attitude was concerned.  
The models developed in this study demonstrate that the determinants of WTP for 
recreational ecosystem services in light of the risks posed by climate change and SLR are 
complex. While individual socio-demographic and economic factors tend to be important 
determinants of public preferences and WTP (Halkos & Matsiori, 2012), our study points 
to education as the single most influential socio-demographic variable (model 3, Table 
3.4). The relationship between individuals’ education and their responses to risk items 
were both positive and significant.  
3.5.3 Implications for water resource management 
Management and policy decisions involving complex ecological systems such as 
the Everglades are well served by employing an integrated framework combining natural 
and social sciences to achieve sustainable and welfare-optimizing solutions (Turner et al., 
2000). This study provides water managers with insight into the associated economic 
benefits of improved fishery ecosystem services vis-à-vis increased freshwater inflows, 
particularly under the looming threat of SLR and its potential impacts on the Everglades 
ecosystems, and addresses some of the classic challenges of ecosystem management: 
uncertainty about the future need for action, lack of current political support, and 
financial burden. Results of this study indicate that the public believes the predicted SLR 
and attendant negative impacts on the Everglades will occur during their lifetime. 
Additionally, that they cannot live with the negative impacts suggests a desire for public 
agencies to act to mitigate the impacts, although results also suggest that people believe 
that agencies alone cannot solve the problem without some assistance from the public.  
74 
 
Results also indicate that respondents have a moderately high level of concern 
about the loss of freshwater and the ensuing effects on recreational fishery productivity 
and their recreational experience. This high level of concern regarding freshwater and 
SLR may contribute to why respondents overwhelmingly express a desire for some 
government action to be taken against these future risks, and why they also feel that they 
as resource users should be responsible for contributing toward future restoration efforts.  
As mentioned previously, this study found the presence of strong risk perception 
and concern about climate change and SLR. Results also provide a clear indication of the 
significant influence of risk perception on users’ valuation of ecosystem services. The 
authors used the  hydro-bio-economic model developed by Brown et al. (2018) to 
estimate the impact of risk perception of valuation. This model allows for monetizing the 
ecosystem service benefits of restoring freshwater flow from the past monthly average 
levels (usually low) to their respective environmental flow targets (high). These benefits 
were estimated using RP-adjusted WTP values as well as non-RP-adjusted values (see 
Table 3.7). When the WTP values were adjusted for Risk Perception (Table 3.6), the 
annual overall ecosystem service valuation (benefit) of users was 40.03% higher than the 
annual benefits estimated using non-RP-adjusted WTP. Similarly, if WTP were held at 
the highest level of RP, the annual total ecosystem benefits would be 136.69% higher 
than the estimate without RP-adjusted WTP. Thus, if freshwater managers are to 
implement any management policies (e.g., water allocation or user fees for restoration 
purposes), it’s worthwhile to consider the appropriate WTP estimates, particularly ones 
which are adjusted for risk perception. When ecosystem services are lost, individuals who 
are more risk concerned lose more in terms of the value they place on those key 
75 
 
ecosystem services than they would otherwise (i.e., with very low or no perception or 
concern toward the risk).  
The immediacy of the resource users’ experience with the ecosystem services 
considered in this study (at least once in the past three years) lends itself to their having a 
higher degree of RP, RC, and RA, and consequently 40% higher WTP. Thus, these 
members of the public, the users of impacted ecosystem services, do not demonstrate a 
high degree of environmental neoskepticism, which could impact environmental 
managers and public agencies. In keeping with the classic “user pay principle” 
(Muradian, O’Connor, & Martínez Alier, 2002), managers and agencies should first go 
after the users who are more engaged and have a higher RP and in turn WTP, but should 
be cautious not to unfairly burden them with excessively high user fees. Ultimately, these 
ecosystem services are public goods, which need to be paid for by the general public, 
regardless of intensity of use. 
3.6. Conclusion   
Results of this study indicate that resource users attach positive and significant 
values to the Everglades recreational fisheries, and the higher levels of WTP suggest they 
would see an increase in the nonmarket benefits for improved restoration efforts. The 
impact of their risk perception, concern, and attitude toward risk reduction actions on 
WTP are particularly salient for water resource managers as they develop plans for future 
restoration in terms of public support for and public funding of these efforts. Public 
perception of freshwater decline and SLR, concern for future risk, and strong feelings of 
personal responsibility could all be significant drivers of stronger political support for 
restoration and mitigation actions by public agencies, including water allocation 
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decisions that prioritize Everglades restoration, new user-based financing options, and 
programs to increase public awareness of how freshwater management addresses climate 
risks. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1. Respondent Demographics 
 Sample (600) 
 n Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 597 38.31 35 14.53 18 85 
Household size 594 2.90 3 1.31 1 10 
Household income ($) 566 64,434 50,000 42,002 20,000 240,000 
Married n %     
 Yes 303 50.67     
 No 295 49.33     
Gender n %     
 Female 339 56.59     
 Male 260 43.41     
Race/Ethnicity n %     
 White 454 71.16     
 Hispanic 91 14.26     
 Black or African-American 55 8.62     
 American Indian or Alaska Native 15 2.35     
 Asian or Pacific Islander 10 1.57     
 Other 13 2.04     
Education n %     
 Less than high school 14 2.34     
 High school / GED 118 19.70     
 Some college 145 24.21     
 College degree  226 37.73     
 Graduate degree 63 10.52     
 Professional degree 33 5.51     
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Table 3.2a. Risk Perception, Concern and Attitude towards Risk Reduction 
Perception of risks n Mean Std. Dev. 
 
(1) I believe that the predicted SLR will happen during my 
lifetime 
599 3.57 1.10 
 
(2) I can live with the negative impacts of SLR on the 
Everglades fisheries and my recreational experience 
599 2.45 1.18 
 
(3) It is too early to worry about SLR and the future generation 
will know how to handle the situation better 
599 2.32 1.22 
Concern about specific risks n Mean Std. Dev. 
 (4) Regarding the SLR in the Everglades 600 3.90 1.07 
 (5) Regarding declining freshwater flow and increasing salinity 600 4.11 0.99 
 (6) For future fish abundance in the Everglades 600 4.23 0.93 
 (7) Regarding the overall ecosystem health 598 4.38 0.93 
Risk Reduction or Regulation  n Mean Std. Dev. 
 
(8) Government agencies must start to take actions to increase 
the freshwater flow in the Everglades 
600 4.12 1.03 
 
(9) As a citizen or resource user, I am also responsible for 
contributing towards the actions to minimize the impacts of SLR 
600 4.07 0.96 
 
(10) The relevant public agencies will manage the freshwater 
flow effectively without my contribution to the effort 
597 2.77 1.25 
 
(11) Any human activities that adversely influence the quality of 
the Everglades health should be regulated 
600 4.05 0.99 
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Table 3.2b. Risk Perception, Concern and Reduction Preferences across Different 
Demographic Groups1 
Demographic 
Characteristics Levels n 
Risk Perception 
(Out of a Max 
Score of 15) 
Risk Concern 
(Out of a Max 
Score of 20) 
Risk Reduction 
(Out of a Max 
Score of 20) 
Florida resident Yes 570 10.8 16.6 15.5 
 No 6 11.3 17.8 16.6 
F   0.296 0.759 0.83 
P   0.586 0.384 0.363 
Married Yes 295 11 16.7 15.4 
 No 303 10.6 16.5 15.5 
F   3.892 0.703 1.22 
P   0.021 0.495 0.296 
Gender Female 260 10.6 16.3 15.4 
 Male 379 11 16.9 15.5 
F   2.056 3.097 1.475 
P   0.129 0.046 0.23 
Race White 422 10.9 16.8 15.6 
 Hispanic 85 10.5 16.4 15.2 
 
African 
American 55 10.6 16.2 15.1 
 
American 
Indian 14 11.3 15.9 14.8 
 
Asian or 
Pacific 
Islander 10 10.4 16.9 15.1 
 Other 13 11 15.8 15.2 
F   0.571 0.722 0.797 
P   0.722 0.607 0.552 
Education  
Less than 
high school 12 10.2 15.4 15.5 
 
High 
school/GED 110 10.4 16.3 15.1 
 
Some 
college 136 10.6 16.5 15.5 
 
College 
degree 218 11 16.9 15.8 
 
Graduate 
degree 58 11.2 17.1 15.3 
 
Professional 
degree 30 11.3 16.9 15.3 
F   2.12 1.052 0.848 
P   0.062 0.386 0.516 
Income2      
F   2.145 1.72 1.274 
P   0.011 0.053 0.224 
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1
In this table, the original respondents’ scores of statements that reflect skepticism towards risk (statement 
# 2, 3 and 10 of Table 2a) are reversed on the scale of 1 to 5 before being grouped with other statements in 
the respective category and the average value for the group is computed.  
2
For brevity, only F statistic values are reported.  
 
Table 3.3. Results of Explanatory Factor Analysis  
Shaded boxes show items loading on each factor with loadings > 0.5. 
Variable 
Factor 1 
(Positive Risk 
Perception) 
Factor 2 
(Risk 
Skepticism) 
Concern about SLR and its impact in the Everglades 0.7832 -0.0210 
Concern about SLR and declining freshwater flow and increasing 
salinity 
0.8409 -0.0428 
Concern about SLR and its impact on future fish abundance in the 
Everglades 
0.8237 -0.0967 
Concern about SLR and its impact on overall ecosystem health 0.8073 -0.0453 
I believe that the predicted SLR will happen during my lifetime 0.5206 -0.2866 
Government agencies must start to take actions to increase the 
freshwater flow in the Everglades 
0.7766 -0.1019 
As a citizen or resource user, I am also responsible for contributing 
towards the actions to minimize the impacts of SLR 
0.7266 -0.0738 
Any human activities that adversely influence the quality of the 
Everglades health should be regulated 
0.6674 -0.2352  
I can live with the negative impacts of SLR on the Everglades 
fisheries and my recreational experience 
0.3481 0.7180 
It is too early to worry about SLR and the future generation will 
know how to handle the situation better 
0.4009 0.6972 
The relevant public agencies will manage the freshwater flow 
effectively without my contribution to the effort 
0.1011 0.7731 
Eigenvalue 4.79053 1.76617 
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Table 3.4. Results of Mixed Logit Model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ASC 
2.5661*** 
(0.40324) 
-5.0811*** 
(0.9900) 
0.6338 
(0.0268) 
2.189*** 
(0.3955) 
2.4309*** 
(0.3851) 
Cost 
-0.0200*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0181*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0203*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0185*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0204*** 
(0.0041) 
Catch 
0.0095*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0085** 
(0.0032) 
0.0095** 
(0.0036) 
 
-0.0177 
(0.0160) 
Keeper 
0.0015 
(0.0049) 
0.0024 
(0.0044) 
0.0025 
(0.0049) 
 
-0.511 
(0.0226) 
Distance 
0.0006 
(0.0030) 
-0.00002 
(0.0027) 
0.0011 
(0.0029) 
 
0.0356** 
(0.0136) 
EcoHealth 
0.0174*** 
(0.0045) 
0.0151*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0172*** 
(0.0043) 
 
-0.0472** 
(0.0174) 
ASC*Perception  
1.0753*** 
(0.2573) 
   
ASC*Concern  
0.5912** 
(0.2450) 
   
ASC*Reduction  
0.2960 
(0.2292) 
   
ASC*Age   
0.0268 
(0.0179) 
  
ASC*Education   
0.3847* 
(0.2315) 
  
ASC*Income   
0.0199 
(0.1563) 
  
Perception*Catch    
0.0026** 
(0.0009) 
0.0076* 
(0.0043) 
Perception*Keeper    
0.0014 
(0.0012) 
0.0145** 
(0.0061) 
Perception*Distance    
-0.0006 
(0.0007) 
-0.0097*** 
(0.0037) 
Perception*EcoHealth    
0.0052*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0179*** 
(0.0049) 
Observations 578 578 578 578 578 
LR chi2 82.73 52.98 86.40 61.94 65.30 
Log-likelihood -1094.227 -1062.1834 -1082.9052 -1088.7186 -1066.0773 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.5. Regression Variables 
Variable Description 
ASC Alternative specific constant 
Cost Additional per-trip cost 
Catch Catch rate 
Keeper Size of the largest keeper 
Distance Travel distance for fishing 
EcoHealth Overall ecosystem health 
Perception Perception of the risks posed by SLR and climate change 
Concern Level of concern about specific risks 
Reduction Attitudes and preferences toward risk reduction and regulation 
Age Respondent age (in years) 
Education Level of education 
Income Annual household income 
 
Table 3.6. Marginal WTP Results at Various Levels of Risk Perception 
 
Model 1 
Attributes 
only 
Model ($) 
Model 5 
 
Attributes-Interacted with Risk Perception Model 
 
Risk Perception  
𝑅𝑃̅̅ ̅̅  = 
3.6 
1a 2a 3 4 5 
Risk-
weighted 
Average 
WTPb 
Catch WTP $0.47 $0.47 $0.00 $0.00 $0.25 $0.62 $1.00 $0.62 
EcoHealth WTP $0.87 $0.85 $0.00 $0.00 $0.32 $1.20 $2.07 $1.21 
a
Computed WTP values were negative at risk perception levels of Likert scale 1 and 2. Since negative 
WTP values (disutility from improved attributes) seem unrealistic, authors discard those values and assume 
WTP values to be zero at risk perception levels of 1 and 2. 
bRisk-weighted average WTP values are computed by using average percent of respondents expressing 
different levels ( 1 to 5) of agreement to all risk questions as weights. On an average, 4.29% strongly 
disagreed (Likert scale = 1), 7.51% somewhat disagreed (2), 19.27% neutral (3), 31.88% agreed (4), and 
37.04% strongly agreed (5) to the eleven risk questions.   
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Table 3.7. Effect of accounting for risk perception on the anglers’ estimated benefit 
from improved recreational services in ENP 
 
Estimated Recreational Benefits from 
Restoring Freshwater Flow at Quarterly 
Target Levels Using 
 
Risk-
unadjusted 
WTP 
Risk-
adjusted 
WTP 
Highest Risk 
Perception 
Level WTP 
Fish WTP ($/% additional catch)  0.47  0.62  1.00  
EcoHealth WTP ($/% improvement)  0.85  1.21  2.07  
 
Quarterly benefits: 
Dec - Feb  1,502,326  2,089,681 3,514,415 
Mar - May  3,803,337  5,372,410 9,139,190 
Jun - Aug  704,106  975,280  1,635,025  
Sep - Nov  845,053  1,161,589  1,936,027  
Sum  6,854,822  9,598,960  16,224,657  
Difference between risk perception-
adjusted and unadjusted ($)   
2,744,138  
(40.03%) 
9,369,835  
(136.69%) 
 
 
Figures 
Figure 3.1. Psychometric risk perception-concern-mitigation paradigm adapted 
from Fischoff et al. (1978) 
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4. A Game-Theoretic Model of Crop Flood Indemnity in South Florida 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Changes in the frequency, spatial distribution, and magnitude of several climatic 
conditions and extreme events are likely to occur in the not too distant future and could 
pose significant risks to human well-being (IPCC 2014). Among such changes are an 
increased potential of flooding due to increased heavy precipitation events and 
accelerated sea level rise, posing particular concern to coastal communities and 
agricultural production. South Florida is among the areas of the U.S. most vulnerable to 
inundation (Gornall et al. 2010; Erwin 2009; Dolan and Walker 2006; Scavia et al. 2002). 
In addition to inundation, rising sea level can increase salinity of freshwater ecosystems 
and aquifers (Scavia et al. 2002). A mosaic of urban settlements, agricultural areas, and 
natural areas, South Florida is served by a highly human-engineered water management 
system (Harwell et al. 1996). Management agencies grapple with managing water to meet 
multiple objectives, including urban and agricultural water supply, flood control, and 
environmental restoration. Climate-induced (e.g., flood, drought, sea level rise) water 
shortage or excess often tests the limits of this engineering system, and extreme events 
are in turn expected to further increase the complexity of managing water resources for 
competing users. 
Heavy precipitation and flooding events in the United States and worldwide in recent 
years have greatly damaged crop production. If model projections of increased weather 
extremes are realized (National Park Service 2009; IPCC 2014), the cost of crop losses 
could increase drastically. Recent studies have attempted to simulate the amount of plant 
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damage from excess soil moisture in order to estimate crop production loss, and found 
that these losses under current climatic conditions might double in the next thirty years to 
an estimated $3 billion annually (Rosenzweig et al. 2002). In 2017, up to 7,000 acres of 
agricultural land in the southern portions of Florida experienced storm surge with salt 
water inundation during Hurricane Irma, with the Florida Department of Agriculture and 
Consumer Services estimating losses at over $30 million (Alvarez 2017). The costs of 
this and other losses may be borne directly by the farmers impacted or transferred to 
private insurers or governmental disaster relief programs. 
As the expected level and intensity of flood and heavy precipitation events increase, the 
amount of indemnities paid upon losses due to these events would also increase. Thus, 
crop insurance claims can serve as a metric of the climate-related vulnerability of 
agriculture. To develop such a metric, it is necessary to study how crop insurance 
decisions are made. Participation patterns have shifted as new insurance products have 
expanded farmers’ choices of types and levels of coverage, and the literature shows a 
variety of factors influencing farmers’ choices among available crop insurance products 
(Makki and Somwaru 2006, 2001; Sherrick et al. 2004; Smith and Baquet 1996; 
Moschini and Hennessy 2001). Chief among these factors is the level of risk, followed by 
the cost of insurance, and the level of premium subsidy.  
Frameworks for evaluating farmers’ crop insurance decisions typically employ the 
standard assumption that farmers will maximize the utility of their net revenue subject to 
physical and technical constraints (Bar-Shira, Just, and Zilberman 1997; Sherrick et al. 
2004; Smith and Baquet 1996; Shaik and Atwood 2017; O. Mahul 1999; Keith H. Coble 
and Knight 2002).  These studies show that the levels of insurance premium and 
91 
 
government subsidy are the two key determinants of farmers’ participation.  
Nevertheless, these two rates are policy decisions made by Risk Management Services 
(RMS) of USDA each year.  RMS grapples with the actuarial decision of optimizing 
insurance and subsidy rates such that net insurance premium creates enough incentive for 
farmers to purchase insurance protection, while private crop insurers are able to 
indemnify crop losses year after year adequately.  This would require that either 
premiums, farmers’ participation, or both are high enough to generate enough premium 
income to cover losses.  However, farmers’ participation level varies inversely with the 
premium. Furthermore, as the expected level and intensity of flood and heavy 
precipitation events increase, the amount of indemnities paid upon losses due to these 
events would also increase. Therefore, ultimate solvency of crop insurance market and 
climate-related crop risk reduction depend on the interactive decisions of RMS, farmers, 
and private insurers, under increasing level of climate-induced crop perils.  
This paper links the occurrence of flooding events and crop insurance indemnity claims 
by simulating farmers’ decision behavior of whether to purchase crop insurance and their 
choices among alternative products, considering varying risk of perils due to climate 
change and sea level rise. Government agricultural policy development and farmer 
response are modeled as a hierarchical Stackelberg leader-follower game-theoretic 
decision process (Bhat, Alexander, and English 1998; Bulut 2017). Hierarchical games 
are multi-level games with at least two players at each level. Such games can be either 
cooperative, in which negotiation between players is permitted, or non-cooperative, in 
which players make decisions independently. In our model, government is assumed to be 
the dominant player, or leader, choosing an optimal crop insurance premium and subsidy 
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in order to optimize the participation response of the subordinate player, or follower, in 
this game represented by farmers. Ultimately, this paper seeks to understand the 
implications of funding insurance subsidies, how subsidy policies can influence 
participation rates, and setting premium prices for adequate participation by farmers and 
on private insurers’ underwriting ability. The model is applied to two specialty crops in 
South Florida, which is predominant in sub-tropical agriculture, prone to tropical storms, 
and one of the least studied regions from a crop insurance point of view.  
4.1.1. Crop Insurance 
Due to a host of stochastic factors, including climatic conditions, agricultural production 
and specifically crop production has been characterized as volatile and risky (van 
Asseldonk, Meuwissen, and Huirne 2003; Joy Harwood et al. 1999). Dismukes (2002) 
states that “its economic returns are subject to events beyond a farmer’s control,” citing 
the examples of market conditions as well as rainfall, temperature, other weather 
conditions, plant disease, and insect infestations. The U.S. government has instituted 
various policies and programs in an attempt to assist farmers in managing these risks, 
starting as early as the 1930s, making payments to farmers in times of low prices and 
providing disaster assistance payments and crop insurance (Glauber and Collins 2002; 
Smith and Goodwin 2006; Dismukes 2002). 
Since the 1930s, the federal crop insurance program has been an important agricultural 
policy instrument (Serra, Goodwin, and Featherstone 2003). The U.S. Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation (FCIC) operates the federally subsidized Multiple Peril Crop 
Insurance (MPCI) Program. The 1980 Federal Crop Insurance Act overhauled the MPCI 
program with the intention to reduce the need for large-scale ad hoc disaster relief 
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programs, expanding coverage access across crops and regions and establishing a target 
participation rate of 50% of planted acreage (Smith and Baquet 1996). The Federal Crop 
Insurance Reform Act of 1994 and the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 again 
restructured the crop insurance program, increasing premium subsidies mainly at lower 
insurance coverage levels then at higher coverage levels, respectively. The Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 further increased premium subsidy rated for 
certain insurable units of land. According to Collins and Bulut (2011), these progressive 
increases in premium subsidies stimulated higher and more diverse participation over 
time, improving the MPCI program’s actuarial performance by “reducing adverse 
selection and enhancing underwriting and ratemaking.” According to Coble (2002), high 
participation rate reflects farmers’ acceptance of MPCI, and “has been a priority of policy 
makers and program administrators… [due to] the widely held belief that MPCI cannot 
effectively substitute for other forms of federal crop disaster relief unless a large 
proportion of farmers are insured.” 
Bulut (2017) cites four reasons for government support of crop insurance. Because crop 
insurance risks are systemic, they may result in missing markets (Duncan and Myers 
2000). This discourages government use of ad hoc disaster payments, which discourage 
the purchase of crop insurance (United States Government Accountability Office 2014; 
van Asseldonk, Meuwissen, and Huirne 2003; Innes 2003). Additionally, asymmetric 
information, causing moral hazard and adverse selection problems, can lead to 
underinsurance market failure (Nelson and Loehman 1987). Lastly, farmers may be 
optimistically biased, systematically underestimating the risk of losses such as those 
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caused by natural disasters (D. R. Just 2002; Oliver Mahul and Stutley 2010; K. H. Coble 
and Barnett 2013). 
Knight and Coble (1997) undertook a survey of crop insurance literature from 1980 
through 1997, examining econometric research conducted at both farm and aggregate 
levels. Farm-level models of demand for crop insurance, following Calvin (1992), 
typically strive to explain farmers’ decision of whether to purchase insurance, or, 
following Smith and Baquet (1996), study the decisions of both whether to purchase and 
how much to insure. When taking an aggregate approach, such as at the county- or state-
level, as in Goodwin (1993), studies generally seek to explain the proportion of either 
land coverage or farmers choosing to insure. Recent studies, such as Richards (2000), 
have examined not only how much land a farmer chooses to insure but also the level of 
coverage they purchase. 
Studies at the farm level have taken a variety of approaches to incorporate some measure 
of return to or cost of insurance. For example, while Calvin (1996) and Coble et al. 
(1996) incorporated the expected return to insurance, Just and Calvin (1990) calculated 
the quasi-rent resulting from insurance. Both Goodwin and Kastens (1993) and Smith and 
Baquet (1996) follow Goodwin (1993) in incorporating the MPCI premium, as does this 
study. These previous studies using premium rate found negative effects on participation 
and quantity of coverage. 
While our study incorporates the MPCI premium to analyze participation, we do so using 
aggregate county-level data to estimate MPCI participation, following similarly to 
Gardner and Kramer (1986), and Barnett, Skees, and Hourigan (1990). Gardner and 
Kramer (1986) found that at the aggregate level, the expected rate of return to insurance 
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[(expected indemnity – premium) / (premium)] had a significant positive effect on 
participation. This is consistent with Cannon and Barnett, who found a negative effect of 
change in the net cost of insurance on crop insurance participation. 
Studies about MPCI purchase decisions since Knight and Coble’s 1997 survey have 
tended to focus on a host of other factors, including risk characteristics and farm income 
level  (Makki and Somwaru, 1999), revealing a relationship between risk and choice of 
insurance contract. Makki and Somwaru (2001) went on to analyze longitudinal crop 
insurance purchase decision data from 1995 to 1999, identifying factors that influenced 
farmers’ choices of crop insurance purchase to varying degrees: risk level, premium 
price, premium subsidy, expected indemnity payoffs, availability of alternative insurance 
products, and various insurance contract characteristics. A study by Changnon (2004) on 
the effects of drought forecasts on crop insurance decisions, based on a survey of 
Midwestern (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, and Ohio) farmers, found that 40% of 
respondents changed their coverage based on the drought forecasts. In terms of risk 
characteristics, Sherrick et al. (2004) found that farmer-specific reservation insurance 
premiums depended on expected rates of return with and without insurance, as well as 
farmer-specific levels of risk aversion. Considering data from a 1989 survey, Just, Calvin, 
and Quiggin (1999) concluded that “risk aversion is a relatively weak incentive for 
participation… [suggesting] that farmers’ asymmetric informational advantages lead to 
insuring those operations with higher expected indemnities” (Ramirez and Scott 
Shonkwiler 2017). 
An analysis of the effect of increased insurance subsidies on land use by Claassen, 
Lubowski, and Roberts (2005) determined that in some areas, as crop insurance subsidies 
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rose, a greater amount of land was put into production. A study by Babcock and Hart 
(2005) specifically examined what effect the subsidy changes related to the 2000 
Agriculture and Risk Protection Act (ARPA) had on insurance purchase decisions, 
comparing coverage levels before and after ARPA and concluding that purchases of 
coverage levels above 65% more than doubled. More recent studies examine the effect 
and magnitude of premium subsidies on insurance participation decisions. O’Donoghue 
(2014) found that corn insurance demand (measured as liability per acre) increases by 
0.13%, nearly doubling depending on region, per percent increase in subsidy per acre. 
Similarly, Yu et al. (2018) found that a 10% increase in subsidy per dollar of liability 
induced a 0.43% increase in planted acreage. 
Much of the literature on crop insurance focuses on participation. While this type of 
analysis provides insight about farmers crop insurance purchase decisions and behavior 
considering crop insurance subsidies, it fails to reveal much about the strategic 
interaction between government (who provides said subsidies) and farmers. More 
recently, however, efforts to analyze this in a theoretical framework have been 
undertaken (Bulut 2017). This study continues such efforts by examining the interaction 
with an empirical analysis of the cases of two specialty crops in South Florida, fresh 
market sweet corn and fresh market tomatoes. This study extends the crop insurance 
literature in several ways. It casts the three-way strategic interactions between farmers, 
insurers and government using a refined theoretical framework, Stackelberg leader-
follower game. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical application of such model to 
crop insurance literature. Second, this study addresses a key policy relevant question that 
agricultural risk management agencies grapple with. Confronted with uncertain climate, 
97 
 
farmers do need an affordable crop insurance program to keep their farming solvent. 
Unless there is adequate participation by farmers, insurance program can neither be 
affordable nor solvent. Their participation rate, in turn, directly depends on net premium 
they pay relative to their reservation premium (i.e., the maximum net premium they are 
willing to pay such that they are indifferent to purchase insurance or not). This 
reservation premium could depend on farmers’ expectations about climate and business 
risks in general. Therefore, it is important for the risk management agency to set premium 
and subsidies such that they do not exceed farmers’ reservation premium, in order to 
ensure a sustained farmers’ participation in the program. The reservation premium and 
subsidy serve as respective ceiling and floor amount, respectively. The model presented 
in this develops a rule for empirically estimating such reservation values under varying 
climate risk scenario. Third, past research on insurance for specialty crops in the tropics 
is limited. South Florida specialty crops provide a unique geographic and insurance 
context given that the region is prone to increasing climate risk and crops involved are 
high value crops. 
4.2. Methods 
4.2.1. Delineation of the study area 
This study focuses on two specialty crops, fresh market corn and fresh market tomatoes, 
in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach counties in South Florida. According to Ligon (2011), 
“Specialty crops, particularly fruits and vegetables, differ in several important respects 
from traditional commodity crops in ways which may affect both demand for insurance 
and the difficulty of supplying insurance.” For example, spatial shocks (e.g., heavy 
precipitation events) which affect production within a relatively small geographical area 
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will have a greater effect on aggregate supply than the same shock for a cereal crop, 
which is storable and has more geographically dispersed production (Ligon 2011).  
The insured liability of specialty crops has been trending upward in recent years (Collins 
2012). In 2011, specialty crops accounted for approximately 2.6 percent of total insured 
acres, but approximately 10.3 percent of total insured liability. This is due in part to 
specialty crops’ high value per acre. Collins (2012) goes on to describe various 
challenges in expanding insurance coverage for specialty crops, including the small 
acreages of some specialty crops, accurately assessing the effects of weather on crop 
production for loss adjustment, and the usual insurance problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. 
As of 2016, Florida ranked first in value of production of fresh market tomatoes, 
accounting for 40% of the total U.S. value, and second in value of production of fresh 
market sweet corn, accounting for 24% of the total U.S. value (Florida Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services 2017).  
Having a subtropical to tropical climate with a wet (warm) season and a dry (cool) 
season, cropping season in South Florida for these vegetables typically coincides with the 
dry season of October through May. Precipitation patterns in general as well as extreme 
precipitation events (in South Florida are found to be significantly correlated with large-
scale climate effects, including the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO), with a 55-
70 year periodicity; the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), with a 20-30 year periodicity; 
and the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), with a 3-7 year periodicity (Gunn 2010; 
South Florida Water Management District 2011; Wong et al. 2014). During El Niño 
years, the polar jet stream takes a more southerly flow which allows more frontal systems 
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to reach Florida, increasing precipitation particularly in the dry season (South Florida 
Water Management District 2011). For the study period of 1989 to 2017, El Niño years 
are 1991-92, 1994-95, 1997-98, 2002-07, 2009-10, and 2014-16 (NOAA). The 2014-16 
El Niño was particularly strong compared to the rest of the US states (Figure 1), leading 
to nearly $3 million in sweet corn and tomato losses in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach 
counties.  
4.2.2. Game-theoretic models 
Game-theoretic methods, both cooperative and non-cooperative, have been widely used 
to simulate the strategic behaviors of agents in the contexts of manufacturing (Zhao et al. 
2012), engineering (Liu, Ji, and Jiao 2013), environmental policy (Bhat, Alexander, and 
English 1998; Sinha et al. 2013; Hong et al. 2017), and   
in insurance markets, e.g., natural disaster and crop insurance markets (El-Adaway et al. 
2015; O. Mahul 1999; Bulut 2017).  Hierarchical market solutions, first introduced by 
Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, have been employed to simulate sequential decision-
making in situations in which one agent has dominating power over the others (von 
Stackelberg 1952). Now known as a Stackelberg equilibrium, this sequential game 
solution concept involves players with asymmetric roles, one a leader and the other 
following. The leader announces their action and the follower responds by choosing their 
optimal response given that announcement. The leader, knowing the follower’s objective 
function and anticipating the response, chooses the action that optimizes their own 
performance given the follower’s rational response. Followers, in order to maximize their 
own objective function, decide whether to take certain action.  In a crop insurance 
market, for instance, farmers as followers would decide which insurance product to 
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purchase given the price of insurance premium, their risk factors, and a vector of 
economic variables. Government, knowing farmers’ optimal decision, sets the premium 
and subsidy levels. The farmers’ dynamic problem will first be developed, and all 
necessary conditions derived. These conditions will then be included as constraints in the 
development of the government’s dynamic problem, in which it attempts to balance the 
income from and flood indemnity claims paid to farmers’ insured crops by insurers. 
Interaction between government and farmers is assumed to be non-cooperative, which 
can still result in a socially efficient decision strategy under certain possible conditions 
(Bhat, Alexander, and English 1998). To this end, a sequential hierarchical game 
becomes particularly relevant for simulating the decision behavior of the government as a 
price-setter for both premiums and subsidies, and farmers as followers aiming to 
maximize their profits given the likelihood of perils. 
4.2.2.1 The farmers’ model 
We consider a large number (𝑁) of farmers. The farmers’ objective is to maximize net 
revenue from agricultural production (market return less production cost), subject to 
stochastic peril. Following Duncan and Myers (2000), a typical farmer n of the 
population faces the prospect of a loss with probability 𝜃 and no loss with probability 
(1 − 𝜃). Farmers are assumed to lack the ability to influence the government’s policy 
decision once it is made. Alternatively, they attempt to optimally make their decisions 
regarding insurance purchase in response to the government’s decision variable. It is 
assumed that farmers are price takers and are in a climatologically homogenous region.   
Without the purchase of insurance, an individual farmer n’s total net revenue (TR) is 
𝑇𝑅 = 𝐴(1 − 𝜃)𝑅        (1) 
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where A is planted acres, R is net revenue per acre, and θ is the expected probability that 
a certain peril will occur. With the purchase of insurance, the farmer’s TR will be lowered 
by the net premium paid as below, 
𝑇𝑅𝑗 = 𝐴[𝜃𝑅𝑗 − (𝑃𝑗 − 𝑆𝑗)]       (2) 
where P is the cost of insurance premiums, S is the subsidy for purchase of insurance, and 
subindex j is the specific insurance product purchased by the farmer. Following the crop 
insurance decision framework of Sherrick et al. (2004), a farmer will decide to purchase 
insurance product j if their expected TR (or utility) with insurance is at least as much as 
without the insurance. Formally, 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑗) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏{𝐴[𝜃𝑅𝑗 − (𝑃𝑗 − 𝑆𝑗)] ≥ 𝐴(1 − 𝜃)𝑅}  (3) 
The above inequality can be solved for either the farmer’s maximum willingness to pay 
(WTP) for insurance (𝑃𝑗
∗) or the minimum subsidy (𝑆𝑗
∗) a farmer is willing to accept 
(WTA) to participate in the insurance market. Solving the inequality, the probability that 
(𝑇𝑅 − 𝑇𝑅𝑗) ≥ 0 is assumed to yield a linear probability function, 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(∆𝑇𝑅𝑗 ≥ 0) = 𝛼𝑋       (4) 
where X is a vector of Pj, Sj, Mj, and CCI, and where M represents prior participation and 
CCI represents general market conditions. Logit and probit models were also considered, 
and ultimately rejected in favor of a linear probability model using a censored Tobit 
estimator. 
4.2.2.2 The government’s model 
Adapting Bulut (2017), a two-stage strategic interaction between the government and 
farmers is considered. In the first stage, the government announces the ex ante premium 
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and subsidy rates. In the second stage, farmer n makes their insurance purchase decision 
by taking these rates as given. Following this, stochastic events unfold, and a loss does or 
does not occur. Thus, in this scenario, the government is the natural Stackelberg leader, 
making the farmer the follower. In the first stage, the leader (government) solves the 
problem of setting premium and subsidy rates by determining how the follower (farmers) 
will respond in the second stage.  
With symmetric information, the government, the leader of this game, is assumed to set 
the price of the premium at the optimal participation price 𝑃𝑗
∗, knowing that the farmer-
followers will optimally decide their participation rate as in (Eq. 4) in response to the 
leader’s optimal insurance rate decision and given level of subsidy. That is, the leader 
attempts to set the premium 𝑃𝑗
∗∗ at a rate that implicitly equates the total premium 
payment with expected indemnity payment. Formally, 𝑃𝑗
∗∗ can be determined by solving,  
𝐶𝑗𝑃𝑗 − 𝐶𝑗𝜃𝑅𝑗 = 𝐶𝑗(𝑃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑅𝑗) = 0       (5) 
Subject to (Eq. 4), where 𝐶𝑗 is the extent of area covered by insurance and is a function of 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑗), or 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗
∗ and total acres (?̅?).  
That is, ?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗
∗(𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑗)(𝑃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑅𝑗) = 0, or, 
?̅?𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗
∗(𝑃𝑗 , 𝑆𝑗 , 𝑀𝑗 , 𝐶𝐶𝐼)(𝑃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑅𝑗) = 0     (6) 
From (6) above, we can develop a function for the optimal premium 𝑃𝑗
∗∗ which will then 
determine the optimal participation rates of farmers for insurance product j. 𝑃𝑗
∗∗ is the 
most that farmers would be willing to pay (reservation premium) at which their return 
with and without insurance would be the same. Formally, 
𝑃𝑗
∗∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡   (7) 
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 4.2.3. Estimation of willingness to pay and willingness to accept 
Probability of participation (Eq. 4) was estimated as a censored Tobit model, with a lower 
limit of 0 and upper limit of 1. Following standard practice (Johnston et al. 2013), the 
estimates of WTP (P*) and WTA (S*) were expressed as the ratios of the variable 
coefficients to participation coefficient as in (Eq. 4). Formally, 
𝑃∗ =
?̂?0+?̂?2?̅?+?̂?3?̅?+?̂?4𝐶𝐶𝐼̂
?̂?1
       (8) 
And, 
𝑆∗ =
?̂?0+?̂?1?̅?+?̂?3?̅?+?̂?4𝐶𝐶?̂?
?̂?2
       (9) 
Crop insurance and loss data were retrieved from the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) Risk Management Agency. Crop production and value data were 
retrieved from the USDA Census of Agriculture. Sources of weather and climate data 
include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Centers 
for Environmental Information Climate Data Online and NOAA National Weather 
Service Climate Prediction Center. Data were aggregated into a county-level format for 
each of the two selected crops, and monthly and annual means were calculated for the 
study period. Dollar variables are deflated to 2017 values. All analysis was conducted 
using Stata13. 
4.3. Results and analysis 
4.3.1 Participation 
At sample mean levels, estimated likelihood of participation for farmers growing fresh 
market sweet corn was 0.7523. Estimates for likelihood participation were higher in 
Miami-Dade County than in Palm Beach County, at 0.7821 and 0.7278, respectively. 
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Farmers growing fresh market tomatoes were approximately half as likely to participate 
in the insurance market, with overall likelihood at 0.3485. Similarly to sweet corn 
farmers, Miami-Dade tomato farmers had a higher likelihood of participation than those 
in Palm Beach, at 0.4041 and 0.2498, respectively. Results from Tobit model estimations 
of insurance market participation are described in Table 4.1.  
Coefficients for premium and subsidy were significant and with expected signs, and for 
both sweet corn and tomatoes the subsidy coefficient is nearly twice that of the premium, 
indicating that the level of government subsidy is a stronger driver of insurance purchase 
decisions than the premium price. Subsidies are on average 55% and 58% of the premium 
price over the study period for sweet corn and tomatoes, respectively, and the model 
reflects this relationship. Insurance participation in the previous period was positive and 
significant, and for both sweet corn and tomatoes was the most influential variable. The 
coefficient for CCI was also positive and significant, although more than double for 
tomatoes versus sweet corn. 
The sample mean per-acre premium price across the study period of 1995 to 2017 for 
fresh market tomatoes was $444.56 per acre (in 2017 U.S. dollars), more than quadruple 
that of fresh market sweet corn ($100.21 per acre). Sample mean of subsidy in dollar per 
acre for sweet corn and tomatoes, deflated to 2017 U.S. dollars, are $55.49 (55.37% of 
the average premium) and $258.99 (58.26% of the average premium), respectively.   
For fresh market sweet corn, farmers’ maximum WTP for premium was $401.09 in 
Miami-Dade and $264.03 in Palm Beach, and $325.84 across both counties. Minimum 
subsidy WTA was $29.77, $86.15, and $60.72 across Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and both 
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counties, respectively. The percent of reservation subsidy to premium in Miami-Dade 
was 7.42% and in Palm Beach was 32.63%, and 18.63% overall across both counties. 
Farmers of fresh market tomatoes similarly had a higher WTP for premium in Miami-
Dade than in Palm Beach, at $1023.35 versus $907.14, and $962.12 overall. Miami-Dade 
tomato farmers were WTA a minimum subsidy of $91.33, while in Palm Beach the 
minimum was $0. The percent of reservation subsidy to premium was 8.92% in Miami-
Dade and 0% in Palm Beach, and 3.11% overall. 
4.3.2 Leader’s actuarial premium model estimation 
Various model specifications for each fresh market sweet corn and fresh market tomatoes 
are described in Table 4.2. Variables in the models reflect those that RMA considers for 
its derivation of actuarially fair premiums, including expected crop price, expected 
participation, expected losses, and expected peril (in this case the specific peril is extreme 
precipitation). The optimal fresh market sweet corn premium estimated at the sample 
average using Model C2 was $126.79. Using Model T1, the estimated per-acre premium 
for maximum participation of fresh market tomato farmers was $508.32. 
Maximum WTP and minimum WTA were estimated for premium and subsidy, 
respectively, for each county individually as well as for sweet corn and tomatoes overall 
and are described in Table 3.  
At the reservation premium, or maximum WTP for insuring sweet corn, there is only one 
crop year, 2010, in which per-acre indemnity exceeds the per-acre reservation premium 
(Figure 4.2). However, the per-acre indemnity exceeds the average annual actual crop 
premium several years during the study period. On the contrary, the actual crop premium 
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stays much below the maximum reservation premium. For tomatoes, the per-acre 
indemnity twice exceeds the maximum per-acre premium, in 2002 and 2012 (Figure 4.3). 
The percent of reservation subsidy with respect to premium for sweet corn and tomatoes 
overall were 18.63% and 3.11%, respectively. In Miami-Dade, the percent of subsidy was 
7.42%, compared to Palm Beach’s 32.63%. This suggests that Palm Beach farmers 
demand higher subsidy rates than do Miami-Dade farmers, and Miami-Dade farmers may 
be more risk-averse. For tomatoes, however, this is reversed, with Miami-Dade farmers 
demanding a higher subsidy rate of 8.92% to 0% for Palm Beach, indicating that Palm 
Beach farmers are willing to insure even without subsidies. 
4.3.2 Policy and climate simulations 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2014) found that reducing premium 
subsidies could potentially save hundreds of millions of dollars in the federal budget, 
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the effects this action would have on participation rates. Holding 
per-acre premium prices constant, reducing subsidies by 20% lowers participation from 
75% to 68% and from 35% to 28% for sweet corn and tomatoes, respectively, at the 
highest level of reduction (Table 4). Nearly all years in which per-acre indemnity exceeds 
per-acre premiums coincide with occurrences of El Niño (Figures 4.2 and 4.3). 
4.4. Conclusions 
The existing literature primarily looked at farmers’ participation behavior (i.e., response 
to insurance premium or subsidy), without looking at the policymaker’s decision. Our 
paper is the first to empirically capture the simultaneity of farmers’ and government 
decisions through a hierarchical strategic leader-follower game model. Farmers’ crop 
insurance participation decision was driven mainly by prior participation and the levels of 
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premium and subsidy. The government’s decision was affected by participation levels, 
crop price, prior indemnity, and peril, and varied by county. The models yielded optimal 
WTP for premium and WTA for subsidy, which have been above the government-set 
premium rates.  
Actual indemnities from flood and excess moisture have exceeded crop premiums in 
several years, and maximum WTP in one year, while per-acre premiums consistently 
stayed well below maximum WTP.  
As evidenced in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, mean per-acre indemnity resulting from excess 
moisture or precipitation sometimes exceeded the mean per-acre premium for both sweet 
corn and tomatoes, while the per-acre premium has remained consistently well below 
farmers’ maximum WTP. The RMA has been able to set the premium at a low enough 
price to encourage participation, while also keeping subsidy rates at a fairly consistent 
level, which has caused the per-acre indemnity to exceed the actual premium a number of 
times. This demonstrates that the government must be cautious in setting premiums in 
response to expected perils. Any government decision to reduce subsidies may adversely 
affect the farmers’ decisions and destabilize the overall crop insurance market. 
Particularly as climate risks continue to increase, this situation may not sustain the crop 
insurance market in the long term, and since the reservation premiums for both sweet 
corn and tomatoes are much higher than the actual observed premiums, farmers may be 
able to handle higher premium prices than what they are currently paying. However, that 
means that RMA must bear a higher subsidy burden, which may be an inevitable policy 
choice RMA may have to make in an effort to keep the insurance market afloat. 
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A trend analysis by the South Florida Water Management District (2011) from 1950-
2008 shows a general decrease in wet season precipitation, possibly due to a shortening 
or delay of the wet season, but an increase in the number of wet days during the dry 
season. Coupled with sea level rise and the attendant need for flood control, a series of 
strong El Niño years could prove catastrophic not only for farmers but for insurers. 
Reductions in subsidies may also negatively impact insurers. As subsidy rates decline, so 
do the corresponding participation rates for a given insurance product. 
 
References 
Alvarez, Sergio. 2017. “Hurricane Irma’s Damage to Florida Agriculture.” 
http://www.freshfromflorida.com/content/download/77515/2223098/FDACS+Irma+
Agriculture+Assessment.pdf. 
Asseldonk, Marcel A.P.M. van, Miranda P.M. Meuwissen, and Ruud B.M. Huirne. 2003. 
“Belief in Disaster Relief and the Demand for a Public-Private Insurance Program.” 
Review of Agricultural Economics 24 (1). doi:10.1111/1467-9353.00091. 
Bar-Shira, Z, R E Just, and D Zilberman. 1997. “Estimation of Farmers’ Risk Attitude: 
An Econometric Approach.” Agricultural Economics 17: 211–22. 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/174314/files/agec1997v017i002-003a009.pdf. 
Barnett, B J, J R Skees, and J D Hourigan. 1990. “Explaining Participation in Federal 
Crop Insurance.” 
Bhat, Mahadev G., Robert R. Alexander, and Burton C. English. 1998. “Toward 
Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollution of Groundwater: A Hierarchical Policy 
Formulation Game.” Natural Resource Modeling 11 (4): 379–403. 
doi:10.1111/j.1939-7445.1998.tb00316.x. 
Bulut, Harun. 2017. “Managing Catastrophic Risk in Agriculture through Ex Ante 
Subsidized Insurance or Ex Post Disaster Aid.” Journal of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics 42 (3): 406–26. www.ag-risk.org. 
Calvin, Linda. 1992. “Participation in the U.S. Federal Crop Insurance Program.” 
Economic Research Service.  
109 
 
Changnon, Stanley A. 2004. “Impacts of the Midwestern Drought Forecasts of 2000.” 
Journal of Applied Meteorology 41 (10): 1042–52. doi:10.1175/1520-
0450(2002)041<1042:iotmdf>2.0.co;2. 
Claassen, Roger, Ruben N Lubowski, and Michael J Roberts. 2005. “Extent, Location, 
and Characteristics of Land Cropped Due to Insurance Subsidies.” 
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/1366_crop insurance letter2.htm. 
Coble, K. H., and B. J. Barnett. 2013. “Why Do We Subsidize Crop Insurance?” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 95 (2). doi:10.1093/ajae/aas093. 
Coble, Keith H., and Thomas O. Knight. 2002. “Crop Insurance as a Tool for Price and 
Yield Risk Management.” In A Comprehensive Assessment of the Role of Risk in 
U.S. Agriculture, 445–68. Boston, MA: Springer US. doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-3583-
3_20. 
Collins, Keith. 2012. “Crop Insurance & Specialty Crops.” No. 1143-2016-92926, 6.  
Collins, Keith, and Harun Bulut. 2011. “Crop Insurance and the Future Farm Safety Net.” 
Choices: The Magazine of Food, Farm and Resource Issues 26 (4).  
Dismukes, Robert. 2002. “Crop Insurance in the United States.”  
Dolan, A. H., and I. J. Walker. 2006. “Understanding Vulnerability of Coastal 
Communities to Climate Change Related Risks.” Journal of Coastal Research 3 (SI 
39): 1316–23. doi:10.2307/25742967. 
Duncan, John, and Robert J. Myers. 2000. “Crop Insurance Under Catastrophic Risk.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82 (4). Narnia: 842–55. 
doi:10.1111/0002-9092.00085. 
El-Adaway, Islam, Kalyn Coatney, Mohamed S Eid, ; Islam, H El-Adaway, M Asce, and 
Kalyn T Coatney. 2015. “Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: 
Game Theory Approach.” Article in Journal of Management in Engineering. 
doi:10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357. 
Erwin, Kevin L. 2009. “Wetlands and Global Climate Change: The Role of Wetland 
Restoration in a Changing World.” Wetlands Ecology and Management 17 (1): 71–
84. doi:10.1007/s11273-008-9119-1. 
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. 2017. “2016 Florida 
Agriculture by the Numbers.”  
Gardner, Bruce L., and Randall A. Kramer. 1986. “Experience with Crop Insurance 
Programs in the United States.” 
 
110 
 
Glauber, Joseph W., and Keith J. Collins. 2002. “Risk Management and the Role of the 
Federal Government.” In A Comprehensive Assessment of the Role of Risk in U.S. 
Agriculture, 469–88. Boston, MA: Springer US. doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-3583-
3_21. 
Goodwin, Barry K. 1993. “An Empirical Analysis of the Demand for Multiple Peril Crop 
Insurance.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 (2): 425–34. 
doi:10.2307/1243755. 
Goodwin, Barry K., and T. L. Kastens. 1993. “Adverse Selection, Disaster Relief, and the 
Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance.” 
Gornall, Jemma, Richard Betts, Eleanor Burke, Robin Clark, Joanne Camp, Kate Willett, 
and Andrew Wiltshire. 2010. “Implications of Climate Change for Agricultural 
Productivity in the Early Twenty-First Century.” Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 365 (1554): 2973–89. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0158. 
Gunn, Angus M. 2010. “Chapter 20: Climate and Weather Extremes.” The Future of the 
World’s Climate, 575. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-386917-3.00010-5. 
Harwell, M A, J F Long, A M Bartuska, J H Gentile, C C Harwell, V Myers, and J C 
Ogden. 1996. “Ecosystem Management to Achieve Ecological Sustainability: The 
Case of South Florida.” Environmental Management 20 (4): 497–521. doi:Doi 
10.1007/Bf01474652. 
Hong, Zhaofu, Chengbin Chu, Linda L Zhang, and Yugang Yu. 2017. “Optimizing an 
Emission Trading Scheme for Local Governments: A Stackelberg Game Model and 
Hybrid Algorithm.” International Journal of Production Economics 193: 172–82. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.07.009. 
Innes, Robert. 2003. “Crop Insurance in a Political Economy: An Alternative Perspective 
on Agricultural Policy.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85 (2). 
Narnia: 318–35. doi:10.1111/1467-8276.00122. 
IPCC. 2014. “Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups 
I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change.” Edited by Core Writing Team, R K Pachauri, and L A Meyer. 
IPCC. 
Johnston, Robert J., Eric T. Schultz, Kathleen Segerson, Elena Y. Besedin, and Mahesh 
Ramachandran. 2013. “Stated Preferences for Intermediate versus Final Ecosystem 
Services: Disentangling Willingness to Pay for Omitted Outcomes.” Agricultural 
and Resource Economics Review 42 (1): 98–118. 
 
111 
 
Joy Harwood, By, Richard Heifner, Keith Coble, Janet Perry, Agapi Somwaru, Jack 
Harrison, Linda Hatcher, et al. 1999. “Managing Risk in Farming: Concepts, 
Research, and Analysist.”  
Just, David R. 2002. “Information, Processing Capacity, and Judgment Bias in Risk 
Assessment.” In A Comprehensive Assessment of the Role of Risk in U.S. 
Agriculture, 81–101. Boston, MA: Springer US. doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-3583-3_5. 
Just, Richard E, Linda Calvin, and John Quiggin. 1999. “Adverse Selection in Crop 
Insurance: Actuarial and Asymmetric Information Incentives.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 81 (4): 834. doi:10.2307/1244328. 
Knight, Thomas O., and Keith H. Coble. 1997. “Survey of U.S. Multiple Peril Crop 
Insurance Literature since 1980.” Review of Agricultural Economics 19 (1): 128. 
doi:10.2307/1349683. 
Ligon, Ethan. 2011. “Supply and Effects of Specialty Crop Insurance.” National Bureau 
of Economic Research No. w16709.  
Liu, Yitao, Yangjian Ji, and Roger J Jiao. 2013. “A Stackelberg Solution to Joint 
Optimization Problems: A Case Study of Green Design.” In Procedia Computer 
Science, 16:333–42. doi:10.1016/j.procs.2013.01.035. 
Mahul, O. 1999. “Optimum Area Yield Crop Insurance.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 81 (1). Oxford University Press: 75–82. 
doi:10.2307/1244451. 
Mahul, Oliver, and Charles J Stutley. 2010. “Government Support to Agricultural 
Insurance: Challenges and Options for Developing Countries.” doi:10.1596/978-0-
8213-8217-2. 
Makki, Shiva S, and Agapi Somwaru. 2001. “Farmers’ Participation in Crop Insurance 
Markets: Creating the Right Incentives.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 83 (3): 662–67. doi:10.1111/0002-9092.00187. 
———. 2006. “Evidence of Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance Markets.” The Journal 
of Risk and Insurance 68 (4): 685. doi:10.2307/2691544. 
Moschini, Giancarlo, and David A Hennessy. 2001. “Agricultural Production: 
Uncertainty, Risk Aversion, and Risk Management for Agricultural Producers.” 
Handbook of Agricultural Economics 1. Elsevier Science Publishers: 88–153. 
doi:10.1016/S1574-0072(01)10005-8. 
National Park Service. 2009. “Potential Ecological Consequences of Climate Change in 
South Florida and the Everglades: 2008 Literature Synthesis.” Homestead, Florida. 
 
112 
 
Nelson, Carl H., and Edna T. Loehman. 1987. “Further toward a Theory of Agricultural 
Insurance.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69 (3). 
doi:10.2307/1241688. 
O’Donoghue, Erik. 2014. “The Effects of Premium Subsidies on Demand for Crop 
Insurance.” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2502908. 
Ramirez, Octavio A, and J. Scott Shonkwiler. 2017. “A Probabilistic Model of the Crop 
Insurance Purchase Decision.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 42 
(1): 10–26. www.rma.usda.gov/pubs/ra. 
Richards, Timothy J. 2000. “A Two-Stage Model of the Demand for Specialty Crop 
Insurance.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 25 (1): 177–94.  
Rosenzweig, Cynthia, Francesco N. Tubiello, Richard Goldberg, Evan Mills, and Janine 
Bloomfield. 2002. “Increased Crop Damage in the US from Excess Precipitation 
under Climate Change.” Global Environmental Change. doi:10.1016/S0959-
3780(02)00008-0. 
Scavia, Donald, John C Field, Donald F Boesch, Robert W Buddemeier, Virginia 
Burkett, Daniel R Cayan, Michael Fogarty, et al. 2002. “Climate Change Impacts on 
US Coastal and Marine Ecosystems [Review].” Estuaries 25 (2): 149–64. 
doi:10.1007/BF02691304. 
Serra, Teresa, Barry K Goodwin, and Allen M Featherstone. 2003. “Modeling Changes in 
the U.S. Demand for Crop Insurance during the 1990s.” Agricultural Finance 
Review. doi:10.1108/00215030380001144. 
Shaik, Saleem, and Joseph Atwood. 2017. “ESTIMATING THE DEMAND OF CROP 
INSURANCE AND SUPPLY OF INDEMNITY PAYMENTS: NEBRASKA 
AGRICULTURE SECTOR.”  
Sherrick, Bruce J, Pierre J Barry, Paul N Ellinger, and Gary D Schnitkey. 2004. “Factors 
Influencing Farmers’ Crop Insurance Decisions.” American Journal of Agicultural 
Economics 86(1) (1). Oxford University Press: 103–14.  
Sinha, Ankur, Pekka Malo, Anton Frantsev, and Kalyanmoy Deb. 2013. “Multi-Objective 
Stackelberg Game Between a Regulating Authority and a Mining Company: A Case 
Study in Environmental Economics.”  
Smith, Vincent H., and Alan E. Baquet. 1996. “The Demand for Multiple Peril Crop 
Insurance: Evidence from Montana Wheat Farms.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 78 (1). Oxford University Press: 189–201. 
doi:10.2307/1243790. 
 
113 
 
Smith, Vincent H, and Barry K Goodwin. 2006. “Crop Insurance, Moral Hazard, and 
Agricultural Chemical Use.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78 (2): 
428. doi:10.2307/1243714. 
South Florida Water Management District. 2011. “Past and Projected Trends in Climate 
and Sea Level for South Florida.” 
Stackelberg, Heinrich von. 1952. The Theory of the Market Economy. Hodge.  
United States Government Accountability Office. 2014. “Crop Insurance: Considerations 
in Reducing Federal Premium Subsidies Considerations in Reducing Federal 
Premium Subsidies What GAO Recommends.”  
Wong, P.P., Ij Losada, J-p Gattuso, J Hinkel, A Khattabi, KL McInnes, Y Saito, and A 
Sallenger. 2014. “Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas.” In Climate Change 
2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 361–409. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Yu, Jisang, Aaron Smith, and Daniel A Sumner. 2018. “Effects of Crop Insurance 
Premium Subsidies on Crop Acreage.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
100 (1). doi:10.1093/ajae/aax058. 
Zhao, Rui, Gareth Neighbour, Jiaojie Han, Michael McGuire, and Pauline Deutz. 2012. 
“Using Game Theory to Describe Strategy Selection for Environmental Risk and 
Carbon Emissions Reduction in the Green Supply Chain.” Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries 25 (6): 927–36. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2012.05.004. 
Tables 
Table 4.1. Tobit regression results, insurance market participation in Miami-Dade 
and Palm Beach counties 
 Fresh Market Sweet Corn Fresh Market Tomatoes 
Observations 51 45 
Log-Likelihood 44.0313 31.5504 
Variable Coefficient (P-value) Coefficient (P-value) 
Per-Acre Premium -0.0033 (0.00) -0.0006 (0.03) 
Per-Acre Subsidy 0.0064 (0.00) 0.0012 (0.05) 
Previous Year Participation 0.5499 (0.00) 0.7343 (0.00) 
Consumer Confidence Index 0.0017 (0.02) 0.0037 (0.00) 
Constant 0.1151 (0.30) -0.3473 (0.02) 
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Table 4.2. Premium regression results 
Fresh Market Sweet Corn 
 Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 Model C4 
Adjusted R Square 0.93 0.87 0.88 0.22 
Observations 36 36 36 36 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Intercept  
-42.5014 
(65.6348) 
-36.7346 
(61.8134) 
-166.8853 
(155.1799) 
Per-Acre Indemnityt-2 
0.06236 
(0.03778) 
0.06248 
(0.03814) 
0.06207 
(0.03755) 
0.26203 
(0.08745)** 
Crop Pricet-1 
0.0384 
(0.0080)* 
0. 0452 
(0. 0132)* 
0.04592 
(0.0128)** 
0.04896 
(0.0327) 
Extreme Rain Eventt-1 
0.10545 
(0.9153) 
0.2892 
(0.9666) 
  
Participationt-1 
53.18154 
(21.8593)** 
72.8229 
(37.5099)** 
70.4319 
(36.1067)** 
126.1255 
(91.1857) 
County Dummy (PB=1) 
-123.7143 
(9.683)* 
- 123.3320 
(9.7931)* 
-122.4839 
(9.2354)* 
 
Fresh Market Tomatoes  
 Model T1 Model T2 Model T3 Model T4 
Adjusted R Square 0.73 0.74 0.01 0.04 
Observations 36 36 36 36 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Intercept   
790.0440 
(311.0084)** 
811.7306 
(291.4989) 
Per-Acre Indemnityt-2 
0.1537 
(0.0902)*** 
0.16188 
(0.0836)*** 
0.1138 
(0.0796) 
0.1081 
(0.0743) 
Crop Pricet-1 
0.02007 
(0.0167) 
0.02398 
(0.0081)* 
-0.0264 
(0.02123) 
-0.0266 
(0.0209) 
Extreme Rain Eventt-1 
2.4297 
(9.0430) 
   
Participationt-1 
104.85 
(174.2490) 
93.67687 
(166.7427) 
-57.4941 
(165.2168) 
-76.3857 
(140.5113) 
County Dummy (PB=1) 
80.6564 
(97.4179) 
89.0560 
(90.9182) 
20.0152 
(88.3249) 
 
*p<.01, **p<.05, ***p<.10 
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Table 4.3. Maximum premium WTP and minimum subsidy WTA for participation 
in crop insurance market, 2017 U.S. $ 
 Overall Miami-Dade Palm Beach 
Fresh Market Sweet Corn    
Maximum premium WTP $325.84 $401.09 $264.03 
Minimum subsidy WTA $60.72 $29.77 $86.15 
Percent of reservation subsidy to 
premium 
18.63% 7.42% 32.63% 
Fresh Market Tomatoes    
Maximum premium WTP $969.12 $1023.35 $907.14 
Minimum subsidy WTA $30.06 $91.33 $0 
Percent of reservation subsidy to 
premium  
3.11% 8.92% 0% 
 
 
Table 4.4. Participation at various levels of subsidy reduction for Sweet Corn in 
Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties, 2017 
Fresh Market Sweet Corn     
% Reduction in subsidy 5% 10% 15% 20% 
$/acre Reduction in subsidy 2.77 5.54 8.32 11.09 
New subsidy per acre $52.71 $49.94 $47.16 $44.39 
Participation rate 73.43% 71.64% 69.84% 68.04% 
 
 
Table 4.5. Participation at various levels of subsidy reduction for Tomatoes in 
Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties, 2017  
Fresh Market Tomatoes     
% Reduction in subsidy 5% 10% 15% 20% 
$/acre Reduction in subsidy 12.94 25.89 38.84 51.79 
New subsidy per acre $246.04 $233.09 $220.14 $207.19 
Participation rate 33.29% 31.72% 30.16% 28.61% 
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Figures 
Figure 4.1. Percent of average precipitation compared to 1981-2010 average, 
January 1996 
 
(Source: https://www.climate.gov/maps-data/data-snapshots)  
 
6Figure 4.2. Per-acre indemnity vs. premium, Fresh Market Sweet Corn 1990-2017 
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Figure 4.3. Per-acre indemnity vs. premium, Fresh Market Tomatoes 1991-2017 
 
 
  
118 
 
VITA 
 
CHRISTINA ESTELA BROWN 
 
    Born, Miami, Florida 
 
2012    B.A., Economics 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
2018     M.S., Environmental Studies 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
2017-2019    Doctoral Candidate 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 
 
Brown, C. E. (April 2015). Valuation of Fishery Ecosystem Services of the Everglades 
Water Management. Poster presented at the Greater Everglades Ecosystem Restoration, 
Coral Springs, Florida. 
 
Brown, C. E. (February 2016). Modeling a Hydro-Economic Penalty Function for 
Recreational Fisheries in Everglades National Park. Presented at the Florida 
International University Department of Earth & Environment Graduate Research 
Symposium, Miami, Florida.  
 
Brown, C. E., Bhat, M. G., Rehage, J. S., and Sukop, M. (March 2016). Linking Hydro-
Ecological Relationships to Economics for Recreational Fisheries in the Coastal 
Everglades. Poster presented at the annual Water Sustainability and Climate Investigator 
Meeting, Arlington, Virginia.  
 
Brown, C. E. and Bhat, M. G. (June 2016). An Integrated Framework for Linking the 
Ecosystem Services Valuation with the Freshwater Flow in the Florida Everglades. 
Presented at The International Society for Ecological Economics, Washington, D.C.  
 
Brown, C. E. (January 2017). Integrating Economic and Biophysical Models for 
Ecosystem Services Valuation in the Florida Everglades. Poster presented at the National 
Council for Science and the Environment, Washington, D.C.  
 
119 
 
Brown, C. E. (February 2018). Risk Perception and Willingness to Pay for Everglades 
Recreational Ecosystem Services. Presented at the Florida International University 
Department of Earth & Environment Graduate Research Symposium, Miami, Florida.  
 
Brown, C. E. (March 2018). Crop Flood Indemnity Claims in South Florida. Presented at 
the Florida International University Agroecology Symposium, Miami, Florida.  
 
Brown, C. E., Bhat, M. G., Rehage, J. S., Mirchi, A., Boucek, R. E., Engel, V., Ault, J. S., 
Mozumder, P., Watkins, W., and Sukop, M. (2018). Ecological-Economic Assessment of 
the Effects of Freshwater Flow in the Florida Everglades on Recreational Fisheries. 
Science of the Total Environment, 627: 480–93.  
 
Brown, C. E. (August 2018). A Game-Theoretic Model of Crop Flood Indemnity Claims 
in South Florida. Presented at the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, 
Washington, D.C.  
 
Brown, C. E. and Bhat, M. G. (September 2018). Valuing Ecosystem Services Under 
Climate Risk: A Case of Recreation in the Florida Everglades. Presented at the 
International Society for Ecological Economics, Puebla, Mexico.  
 
Brown, C. E. and Bhat, M. G. (November 2018). Valuing Freshwater Ecosystem 
Services: A Missing Peace in the Restoration and Climate Change Debate on the Florida 
Everglades. Presented at the Southern Economic Association, Washington, D.C.  
 
Brown, C. E. and Bhat, M. G. (April 2019). Linking Recreational Ecosystem Service 
Benefits with Freshwater Management in the Everglades. Presented at the Greater 
Everglades Ecosystem Restoration, Coral Springs, Florida.  
 
 
 
